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NOTES
RIGHT OF REDEMPTIONER OF Assum :D BONDS TO INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONs
FOR PREMIUM AND UNAMORTIZED DISCOiINT*
A HOLDING company acquired the properties of its four subsidiaries under
agreements whereby it assumed-subsidiaries' bond issues as part consideration
for the transfers. Several years latpr, the holding company retired the as-
sumed bonds before maturity, some being called at a premium. In its con-
solidated return for the taxable year in which the redermptions occurred, the
holding company claimed an allowance of deductions both for the redemption'
premiums and for the unamortized portion of the discount and expenses
incurred in the flotation of one of the assumed issues. In an opinion from
which six inembers dissented' in whole or in part, the Board of Tax Appeals
denied deduction of the premiums because the taxpayer had neither shown
that the assets received in exchange for assumptior, of the bonds were not
worth as much as the amount paid in redemption, nor indeed that the entire
transaction had resulted in a loss.2 Likewise, the Board refused to allow a
deduction of the unamortized discount and expenses, on the ground that the
subsidiary's assets had been conveyed to the parent by an outright sale, which
both removed the privilege of continued amortization by the subsidiary, since
it precluded payment of the bonds at maturity by that party, and prevented a
succession to that privilege by the assuming taxpayer, since a purchaser of
assets, as contrasted with one who acquires by a consolidation or merger,3
is not considered for this purpose to step into the shoes of the transferor.4
*Coast Counties Gas & Electric Co., 33 B.T.A. 1199 (1936).
1. The chief point of difference was the effect to be giver1 to the stipulated fact
that the subsidiaries redeemed the bond issues. The majority opinion treated this fact
as immaterial because the funds were furnished by the parent company in accordance
with its agreement, and the subsidiaries were merely conduits through which the tax-
payer's payments passed to the bondholders. But Member Smith, dissenting, insisted
that in view of the stipulation that the subsidiaries themselves called the bonds, the case
fell within the established rule awarding deduction of premium and unamortized dis-
count and expenses to an original obligor redeeming its bonds previously issued for
cash. See note 5, infra. If Member Smith's viewpoint were adopted, there would be
no occasion for further discussion of the case. Consequently, for purposes of this
discussion, the interpretation of the majority is accepted.
2. Coast Counties Gas & Electric Co., 33 B. T. A. 1199 (1936)'.
3. If there has been a merger or congolid'ation in conjunction with the assump-
tion of the bonds, the assuming corporation is entitled to continue amortization of the
discount and expenses over the remaining life of the bonds. Western Md. Ry. v. C omm'r
of Int. Rev., 33 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; New York Central R. R. v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 79 F. (2d) 247 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935). •
4." Turner-Farber-Love Co. v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 416 (App. D. C., 1933);
American Gas & El. & Subsid. Co., 33 B.T.A. 471 (1935). The standard reason for
denial of continued deductions by the assuming vendee is that the assumption of tle
bonds is by purchase and agreement, instead of by operation of law, as in the case of
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Clearly, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct the premium and the unamortized
portion of both discount and expenses, upon retirement of bonds sold for
cash by the taxpaying corporation itself.5 And the same right would probably
a merger or consolidation. The real reason, however, is found in decisions granting
deduction of unamortized discount and e%penses to a vendor of property as a loss in-
curred in the sale. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 19 B. T. A. 788 (1930) ; Metropolitan Properties
Corp., 24 B. T. A. 220 (1931). (These decisions are predicated on the presumption
that the property was worth the face value of the debt at date of assumption-a method
of valuation which, however, the Board refused to adopt in the principal case.) There-
fore to allow the vendee subsequently to continue pro rata deductions over the remaining
life of the bonds or to deduct the entire unabsorbed discount upon retirement of the
issue before maturity, would be to grant a second gratuitous allowance for the same
item. But, in the principal case, the facts were probably such that neither the vendor
subsidiary nor the vendee parent company could have deducted the loss at the time of
the exchange, for the reason that the transfer was probably both an intercompany trans-
action and a "reorganization," upon which no loss or gain was recognized by the Revenue
Acts. M=Lm. r, E ircns, Evza , REonoAnzATzor Ano Omen Excamicms nr
F mL.L IxcomE TAxATiOx (1931) 119, 356 et seq.; Comment (1935) 45 YAE I. J.
134; dissent in American Gas & El. & Subsid. Co., 33 B.T.A. 471, 476 (1935). If
such were the circumstances, the status of the unamortized discount and e.,penses should
be regarded as undisturbed by the sale of assets and assumption of the bond issue, and
upon redemption by the taxpayer, the then remaining portion of the unamortized discount
and expenses, as well as the premium, should have been held deductible. However, in
view of the taxpayer's failure to introduce evidence of the nature of the transfer of
assets, the Board's hypothesis that there was an outright sale of assets which was
neither an intercompany transaction nor a reorganization, is accepted throughout this
note.
5. Relvering v. Cal. Oregon Power Co., 75 F. (2d) 644 (App. D. C., 1935).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art 544 (1918); U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 545 (1921); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 545 (1926); U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 6S (1928); U. S. Treas.
Reg. 77, Art. 68 (1932); U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22(a)-1 (1934); 361 C. C. H.
1936 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 8I, 82, 83. Redeription premium is now definitely deductible
in the year of the redemption. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. McLaughlin,
65 F. (2d) 677 (C. C.A. 9th, 1933); National Tile Co., 30 B.T.A. 32 (1934);
Helvering v. Cal. Oregon Power Co., mupra. The corollary of this, that the purchase
of its own bonds at a discount subjects a corporation to taxation on that discount, was
established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S.
1 (1931), overruling a line of decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals which e.%empted
retirement discount from taxation even though the Treasury Regulations specifically
directed taxation of the discount as income. See Note (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV.
269; Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 280, 2S2, note 14. Discount and expenses incident
to flotation of bonds, as distinguished from retirement before maturity, are deductible
pro rata over the life of the issue, in the returns of the obligor, Chicago, R. . & Pac.
Ry., 13 B.T.A. 983 (1928), afflrined and reversed on other ismes, 47 F. (2d) 990
(C. C.A. 7th, 1931) cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) ; Union Pacific R. R., 26 B.T.A.
1126 (1932), affied and reve Yed on other issues, 69 F. (2d) 67, 966 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934), afirined, 293 U. S. 282 (1934): The discount is, in accounting theory, a portion
of the interest in amount sufficient to make the coupon rate correspond with the
"effective" or current market rate, and, being applicable to the whole period of the
life of the bonds, should be spread equitably over that period. 2 KESma, Accomuimna
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accrue to a taxpayer retiring bonds that it had assumed in consideration for
a cash payment from the issuer. However, when the taxpayer has issued
bonds in payment for properties,0 or when, as in the principal case, bonds
have been assumed by the taxpayer as part consideration for properties of
the issuing corporation, uncertainty as to the value of the properties precludes
any assurance that the payment of the redemption premium represents a
loss,7 since these assets may have been worth more than the face value of
the bonds; 8 and therefore the failure of a taxpayer to introduce any evidence
of the worth of the pt.rchased assets at the date of the sale constitutes a
failure on his part to establish the loss, if any, incurred upon retirement of
the bonds. Where a taxpayer, in consideration for properties received, is
obligated on bonds, and those bonds are repurchased by it at less than their
face amount, the Board and the courts, in the absence of any evidence as to
the actual value of the properties, have presumed that such properties were
worth, at the date of their purchase, the aggregate par value of the bonds.0
But the presumption-has been used only to favor the government in situations
THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1933) 199-200; HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1928) 70, 229.
New York, Chi. and St. L. R. R., 23 B. T. A. 177, 196 (1931).
6. There have been no decisions as to deductibility of premium j aid upon re-
tirement of bonds issued for property. However, where railroad properties were pur-
chased by issuance of bonds, which were later purchased by the issuer below par, the
discount was held taxable. Montana, Wyoming, & Southern R. R,, 31 B.T.A. 62
(1934), afiirmed, 77 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935). Prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931), cited supra,
note 5, whether the bonds were issued for property or cash was deemed immaterial, for
no taxable income was recognized in either case upon repurchase of the bonds below
their face value. Note (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 269, 273, note 31.
7. This disturbing factor, however, is not involved where bonds are assumed in-
cident to a transfer of properties in a consolidation or merger, since the successor
corporation steps into the shoes of its component corporations and is treated as though
it had originally issued the bonds for cash, all the properties of the component corpora-
tions retaining their original cost basis. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 33 B.T.A.
1189 (1936). But where, as in the principal case, there has been an outright sale of
assets, the assets do not retain their original cost basis. They must be revalued before any
deduction of redemption premium can be granted.
8. For example, note the language of the majority opinion: Coast Counties Gas &
El. Co., 33 B. T. A. 1199, 1204 (1936). Thus the Board had adequate reason to refuse
allowance of the premium. Its recognition of the expenses incurred in redemption of
the bonds as a proper deduction appears however to be an inconsistency. The acquired
properties might have been worth as much as, or more than, the total amount of the
expenses, premium, and par value of the assumed bonds.
9. New York, Chicago and St. L. R. R. v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 152 (App. D. C., 1933)
("There is nothing to suggest that the property acquired was of less value than the
face of the bonds issued."); Montana, Wyoming & Southern R. R. 31 B.T. A. 62
(1934), afflrmed, 77 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Suncrest Lumber Co., 25 B. T. A.
375 (1932) (bonds had been issued for bonds of another corporation, and discount
upon retirement of taxpayer's bonds was held taxable because "there is no evidence
produced by petitioner that it did not receive the full face value for its bonds when
issued.").
in which the taxpayer might othenvise have escaped taxation through his
failure to reveal facts necessary to the computation of the tax. Such a pre-
sumption should not be available, as in the principal case, to support the tax-
payer who, being peculiarly in possession of all the essential facts, has the
burden of proving the value of purchased assets.0-0
If the taxpaying corporation in the instant litigation is thus to bear the
burden of proof, there is need for a determination of the technique to be
employed by it in order to establish satisfactorily the value of the subsidiaries'
assets at the time of their purchase.'- Inasmuch as the issues presented by
the main case, if they had arisen upon the redemption of bonds issued or
assumed for cash, would have been decided with reference to the amount
of cash so received, the decisive element, when properties have been received,
would seem, by analogy, to be the cash equivalent of those assets at the date
of acquisition, or market value.- The difference between the market value
of the assets and the principal amount of the bonds would constitute either
the discount or the premium to be amortized over the life of the issue;'-a
10. The burden of proof in taxation cases is upon the petitioner. Rule 30 of Rules
of Practice. 362 C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 1685.
11. A theory that the sum paid to redeem the bonds fixed the purchase cost of
the assets as of the date of their acquisition, was relied upon by the Commissioner.
Although this proposal has the advantage of avoiding the difficulty of valuing the
assets, it arbitrarily deprives a taxpayer of possible deduction for premium and un-
amortized discount upon redemption of bonds issued or assumed for properties. Since
appellate federal courts have overruled the Board's previous application of this theory
where it would have defeated taxation of discount, [Helvering v. American Chicle Co.,
291 U.S. 426 (1934), reversing 65 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) whfch had afflrmed,
23 B.T. A. 221 (1931); Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Coastwise Trans. Corp., 71 F. (2d)
104 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), reconsidering 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ovemdfng,
22 B. T.A. 373 (1931), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934)] it would be unfair to revive
the principle in order absolutely to defeat deduction of redemption premium and Um-
amortized discount and expenses. For an attack upon the theory as applied by the
Board in Helvering v. American Chicle Co., cited supra, see Wakefield, Gah on Re-
firmen of Bonds Issued for Property, (1933) 11 TAx MAG. 249.
12. As yet there have been no cases in which the questions of amortization of
discount, or of deductibility of premium and unamortized discount upon redemption,
as applied to bonds issued or assumed in the purchase of properties, have been decided.
There have been a few instances, however, in -which the taxpayer issued its own bonds
for bonds of another corporation. In Southern Railway Co., 27 B.T. A. 673 (1933)
affirmed and reversed on other isses, 74 F. (2d) 887 (C. C.A. 4th, 1935), the tax-
payer was not permitted to deduct alleged discount on the issuance of its bonds for
the bonds of another company which had the same face value, but a lower fair market
value than the taxpayers' bonds, because the holders of the bonds sold to the taxpayer,
having voting control of their company, might have driven a hard bargain. This hold-
ing does not preclude the possibility that discount would be allowed in the normal
situation where the market value of the purchased property coincides with its value to
the taxpayer.
12a. It is to be noted that while expenses incurred in issuance of bonds for cash
or properties are properly amortized by the issuer over the life of the bonds, the
unamortized expenses at date of assumption should not be available to an assuming
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and likewise the difference between the market value of the properties and
the sum paid in redemption of the issue, as necessarily modified by adjust-
.ment for discount or premium already amortized, would fic the amount of
premium or discount attributable to the retirement of the bonds before matur-
ity.13 The market value of those assets for which there is an organized
market are readily ascertainable; however, many assets can only be valued
by appraisal, a highly conjectural process replete with practical 14 and con-
ceptual 5 difficulties. Therefore it may be more expedient to determine the
value of the properties received by the less direct method of ascertaining the
value of the bonds assumed or issued for them. This method need not be
inaccurate, although it rests 6n the assumption that the bonds and assets
exchanged are equal in value.'0 The most objective, as well is the most con-
corporation. There is, however, a theoretical argument that some deduction should
be granted to the assuming corporation in lieu of expenses that would have been in-
curred if it had issued bonds for the purpose of raising cash with which to buy the assets.
13. For the Treasury Regulations prescribing the mcthod of computation in the
usual situation where the bonds have been issued for cash, :,. note 5, supra. Although
there has as yet been no sanction of the practice by the taing authorities, there seems
to be no valid objection to using the same technique where properties instead of cash
are obtained by issuance or assumption of bonds. It is to be noted that application of
the suggested method to the principal case would not result in allowance of deduction
for the amount of premium or unamortized discount claimed by the petitioner, for that
amount was computed with reference to the cash received by the issuing subsidiaries
rather than with reference to the value of the assets received by the assuming taxpayer.
Instead, the valuation placed on the purchased assets would furnish a new basis upon
which one could calculate either discount or premium incident to assumption to be
amortized over the remaining life of the assumed issues, and also premium loss or
discount gain incident to redemption.
14. The taxpayer first encounters the rule developed in cases of valuation for
purposes of depreciation allowances and of computation of capital gains tax, that the
Commissioner's valuation is accepted unless contrary evidence is introduced. 361 C. C. H.
1936 Fed. Tax Serv. 697.1756. And once the taxpayer submits evidence as to the
value of the assets through testimony of experts, the Board may still disregard it and
choose a different figure. Wessel v. United States, 49 F. '(2d) 137 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931);
361 C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax Serv. 697.1353.
15. Innumerable concepts of valuation have been employed, no one of which is,
in itself, satisfactory: book value, capitalization of earnings, reproduction cost, recent
sales of similar properties, etc. 361 C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax Serv. f1697. Tangible and
intangible property are not necessarily valued in the same way. Herald-Dispatch Co.,
4 B.T.A. 1096 (1926).
16. Ordinarily, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that a
purchase of properties involves an even exchange. Wakefield, cited note 11 .stpra, at
251. If there has been a forced or quick sale by an eager vendor, the consideration
actually paid will be disregarded. Fraiser Brick Co., 10 B.T. A. 1252 (1928); 361
C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax. Serv. 1 697.179-80. In view of the fact that the transfers,
in the principal case, were between subsidiaries and parent, rather than arms-length
transactions, some doubt might be cast upon any valuation set up by the parent for
purposes of deductions upon redemption. And language used in Kansas City Southern
Ry. et. al., 22 B. T. A. 949, 963 (1931) reversed on other issues, 75 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935) indicates unwillingness of the Board to accept the presumption of an even
venient, measure of bond value is, of course, the market value of the bonds; 17
but if the bonds issued or assumed are not listed on an exchange, or not
conveniently quoted in unlisted dealings, the Board may face difficulties. A
convenient way out is available in the acceptance of the aggregate face value
of the bonds.-8 This criterion, however, is arbitrary and unrealistic and the
Board's view in the principal case reflects a common disapproval of that
solution.' 9 A more accurate measure of the value of the bonds at the date
of purchase could be obtained by adjusting the principal amount of the bonds
to the effective rate of interest current at that time.-0 But even adjusted par
value is not completely satisfactory as an index of the value of the properties
acquired, for it neglects the credit standing and earnings prospects of the
issuing or assuming corporation, factors which are decisive in the analysis of
a bond's investment value.2 ' It is not yet certain which of these alternative
methods of valuation will be adopted by the Board and the courts, as no
case has squarely presented the issue for decision.
The Board, in the principal case, seeking proof that the premium repre-
sented in fact a loss, did not rest its decision alone upon the omission of the
taxpayer to demonstrate the value of the properties at the date of acquisition
by any of the methods discussed above. It went further, indicating a desire
for evidence relating to the history of the assets subsequent to their ac-
quisition by the parent company. This insistence appears to be a misapplica-
exchange. In that case the Board rejected the theory that the value of purchased
bonds was determined by the market value of the bonds issued therefor, and refused
any deduction for discount for the reason that the acquired bonds may have been worth
the face value of the issued securities. However, the principal case is distinguishable
in that the purchased assets are more difficult to value than purchased bonds and there
is a real necessity to look to the consideration paid therefor as a basis of computationi
of discount and premium.
17. It is essential that the market value immediately after, rather than just prior
to, the assumption be taken, for substitution of the new obligor of a different credit
standing will have an effect upon the worth of the bonds.
18. Because of its definiteness, the Commissioner frequently has seized npon the
aggregate par value as a basis for computation of a tax on discount due to retirement
below par. See note 9, supra. If the taxpayer had proved that the assets or properties
were of a different value, the outcome would probably have been otherwise.
19. If the par value had been adopted,,an allowance of a deduction to the assuming
parent company for the claimed redemption premium would have been granted, but the
unamortized discount and expenses could not have been deducted since the use of the
face value as a criterion disregards the possibility of assumption at a discount, and,
of course, any discount and expenses incurred by the issuer would not be deductible
by the assuming corporation except in a consolidation or merger. See notes 3 and 4,
supra.
20. The necessary adjustment can be accomplished by -a mathematical process.
2 I CnsIm, ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRAcTiCE (3d ed. 1933) 201-209. Recognition is
thus given to the fact that the bond obligation includes payment. of interest as well
as principal, and that coupon rates vary among bonds issues. And once this adjusted
value has been ascertained, it constitutes the basis for computation of assumption dis-
count or premium to be amortized over the remaining life of the issue, as well as
redemption premium or discount.
21. IzsZms, supra, note 20, at 193.
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tion of the principle advanced in the much-criticized2 2 case of Bowers v.
Kerbaugh-Empire Company,23 that the retirement of a loan and the fate
of the proceeds of that loan may be treated as a unitary transaction' for tax
purposes: that is, that even if a premium loss were definitely shown to have
been sustained at the time of redemption, it might be lost to the taxpayer
as a deduction by reason of a prior or subsequent profit from sale of the
assets secured in the original transfer. That principle has, since its intro-
duction, been limited to instances where the whole transaction has been
completed at the time when the tax issue arises. 24 Thus, in a situation
directly converse to that in the principal case, the Supreme Court held "3
that the discount incident to the retirement of bonds at less than par was
taxable as a gain because the taxpayer had failed to show that the whole
transaction had been completed, and completed at a loss, as in the Bowers
case. Since the transaction can be completed only by the resale of the
properties taken when the bonds were assumed, and not by changes in
their market value,20 the taxpayer in order to escape taxation of the retire-
ment discount must prove a resale of the assets prior to the retirement of
the bonds, and a loss therefrom offsetting the discount. Accepting this
view, the Board in the principal case denied the claimed deduction for
redemption premium, in part at least, for the absence of evidence as to the
fate of the purchased assets. No indication was given by the opinion as to
what evidence would have been satisfactory. Possibly the taxpayer would
be required to prove a completion of the transaction by a resale of the assets,
22. I MoNTGomERY, INcOME TAX PROC-DURE (1927) 357; Altman, Net Losses and
the Taxable Year (1933) 28 ILL. L. Ray. 525, 527, et. seq.; Rottschaefer, The Concept'
of Income in Federal Taxatio) (1929) 13 MImN. L. REv. 637, 661-64; Comment (1931)
40 YALE L. J. 960; Notes (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 110, (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 334. All
the criticisms point out that the gain in repayment of the loan was independent of the
losses in construction business, and that the losses- therefrom had already been deducted
in prior years.
23. 271 U. S. 170 (1926).
24. In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931), a recovery from
the government of sums lost in previous years on a government contract was held
taxable, the Bowers case being distinguished in that no money or property was there
received which could have been made subject to the tax. In United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931), retirement discount was held taxable on the ground
that there was no shrinkage of assets, as in the Bowers case. And finally, in Commtr
of Int. Rev. v. Coastwise Trans. Corp., 71 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934), reconsider-
tig 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934), shrinkage
of the assets acquired by issuance of notes was not sufficient to prevent taxation of the
gain upon retirement of the notes below their face amount, because so long as the
assets were still unsold, the transaction was not completed. See Altman, cited note 22
supra, at 529, for the idea that the Burnet and Kirby decisions nullified the Bowers
decision without directly overruling it.
25. Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U. S. 426 (1934).
26. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Coastwise Trans. Corp., 71 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st,
1934), reconsidering 62 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) cert. denied 293 U. S. 595
(1934). Accord: Consolidated Gas Co. of Pitt., 24 B. T. A. 901 (1931), on rehearing of
24 B.T.A. 331 (1931).
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without a gain on the deal to offset the premium loss; or he might fulfill
his burden of proof simply by showing that all the assets had not been
resold at the time of redemption of the bonds. If the former requirement is
adopted, an unreasonable burden is placed upon the taxpayer seeking to
establish a loss. 27 Furthermore, it might always be presumed that the assets
have been retained, so as to avoid the remote issue of the Bowers case in
every litigation, unless a taxpayer is seeking relief under the doctrine of the
Bowers decision, when he can conveniently be required to satisfy its condi-
tion. To accord the final disposition of the assets a wider significance,
as the Board seems to do in the principal case, is to ignore the vital dis-
tinguishing factor that here, for the first time, the issue is one of deductibility
of a cash expenditure, and not taxability of non-cash income. The only
justification for the principle of the Bowers case is that where a non-cash
income results from retirement of a debt obligation at less than face, the
taxpayer should be permitted to escape taxation of that income by showing
a completion of the entire transaction at a loss, or without a gain, interfering
with cash ability to pay any tam The fundamental concept of the year as
the unit for administering the income is violated,28 and prior losses of the
proceeds of that loan, or prior losses incident to resale of properties acquired
by assumption of a debt, although already deducted in the returns for the
unsuccessful years,29 are recognized a second time because they have pre-
vented cash gain susceptible to taxation. But, in the principal case, if the
taxpayer had proved that the sum paid in redemption of the bonds exceeded
the value of the purchased assets, the portion of the cash outlay representing
this excess, or premium, should have been held deductible as an expense,
regardless of the subsequent disposition of the assets. Since any profits or
losses from resale of the acquired properties will be taxed or deducted in
the years of their occurrence, any attempt to offset those profits against the
premium expenditure constitutes a double tax recognition of that portion of
the profits equal to the amount of the premium, by an unwarranted deviation
from the administrative procedure of takation on the basis of events within
single years as units.30
27. Since the normal situation in the case of a transfer, of assets for assumption
of bonds is one where most of the assets are not resold, but e.xhausted by depredation,
or if resold, not all are disposed of before retirement of the bonds, a requirement that
completion of the transaction be shown would defeat any possiBility of deduction for
redemption premium in virtually all cases.
28. See note 30, infra.
29. See note 22, supra.
30. The taxing statutes prescribe the year as the unit. §§ 41, 43, 48, Rev. Acts of
1928, 1932, 1934, 1936. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 25 (1926); U. S. Treas.
Reg. 74, Art. 324 (192); U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 324 (1932); U. S. Treas. Reg.
86, Art. 41-44 (1934). For the administrative necessity of treating the ta.xable year
as a unit and of disregarding any relation between years, see Altman, Net Loses and
the Taxable Year (1933) 28 IL_ L. Ray. 525. There are obviously two independent
sources of gain or loss to a corporation which has acquired properties by issuance
or assumption of bonds: (1) resale of the purchased assets; (2) retirement of the
loan. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 960, 963. Any attempt to recognize a rela-
tionship between the two complicatzs tax administration.
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FAILURE TO HOLD TRUST FUNDS IN FIDUCIARY CAPACITY AS
BREACH OF TRUST*
THE PLAINTIFF deposited with the defendant, a corporate trustee, a sum
of money to be invested at the discretion of the company's officers. After
several changes in investment made in the exercise of that discretion, the
fund was finally placed in a note secured by a mortgage on real property
which met all the legal requirements for trust investments, but which, in
accordance with the generally established practice of the defendant and other
corporate trustees, was recorded in the name of the defendant corppration,
with a separate declaration of trust deposited in the plaintiff's trust port-
folio to the effect that the company held the security as its financial agent.
The plaintiff did not know that its holdings were in the name of the cor-
poration, although there was no concealment of the facts and it received
quarterly statements which showed that mortgages, for which the plaintiff
had executed no releases, had from time to time been taken out of its
account and others substituted in their stead. Upon subsequent foreclosure
of the mortgage for non-payment of interest, the plaintiff learned that the
bank held title to the mortgage and foreclosed property in its own name,
and it disavowed the fransaction and demanded the amount originally in-
vested in the mortgage plus interest. The trial court awarded judgment to
the plaintiff for the full amount, but the Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut, while admitting that the defendant's holding the mortgage in its
own name amounted to a breach of trust, intimated, nevertheless, that it
had acted in good faith, and that the loss was due, not to the defendant's
misfeasance, but to the decline of land values during the depression; the
case was remanded with directions to surcharge the defendant only if the
plaintiff should prove otherwise.'
It is generally accepted that trusteeship must be disclosed, in order that
an unfaithful trustee may not claim profitable investments as his own or
make the trust fund a catch-all for his unsatisfactory ventures.2 Adequate
earmarking of trust assets also obviates the necessity of litigation to trace
trust property in the hands of attaching creditors of the trustee,3 protects
*Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 121 Coin. 558, 186 Atl. 543 (1936).
I. Ibid.
2. Mitchell v. Moore, 95 U.. S. 587 (1877); in re Union Trust Co., 86 Misc. 392,
149 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1914), aff'd,.219 N.Y. 514, 114 N.E. 1057 (1916);
Estate of Wolfe, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 22, 1936, p. 385, col. 4 (Surr. Ct.); In re Yost's
Estate, 316 Pa. 463, 175 Atl. 383 (1934); 3 BoEaRT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935)
§ 596; RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (1935) § 179, Comment d. Contra: Barney v. Parsons,
54 Vt. 623 (1882).
3. The attaching creditor is not considered a bona fide purchaser for value and
cannot cut off the cestui's interest even where the investment is in the trustee's own
name. Waterman v. Buckingham, 79 Conn. 286, 64 At. 212 (1906); Gratzinger v.
Arehart, 198 N. E. 787 (Ind. 1935); Hart v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 33 Vt.
252 (1860). But the property, once taken, may .e difficult to recover. In re Union
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the beneficiairy from loss by sale to a bona fide purchaser for value and
safeguards those who might otherwise extend credit to the trustee on the
strength of assets which are not his.4 Mere knowledge of the trustees
improper handling of the investment, moreover, does not operate as a
consent or ratification of the breach of trust involved in the trustee's failure
to disclose his fiduciary capacity;' in order to be bound by acquiescence,
it is generally held that the beneficiary must have been aware of his legal
rights under the circumstances.0 For such a breach of trust the trustee is
surcharged in the majority of cases with the entire amount originally in-
vested, together with interest and incidental 'damages, regardless of the
actual cause of the loss.7 More recent decisions, however, tend toward the
view adopted by the Connecticut court, under which a trustee who has
acted in good faith is liable only for those losses which seem to be directly
connected with his failure to disclose his trustee status.8
While bona fide trustees apparently need not fear the consequences of
breaches of trust of this type if they are not to be surcharged with all
losses to the trust funds, the likelihood of exemplary penalties for flagrant
and continuous abuses may well "compel trustees to protect themselves by
disclosing their trusteeship of all trust investments.9 This would involve
a change in trust company practices of many years' standing 0 under which
trustees invested trust funds in their own names and effected changes in
trust investments simply by the cancellation, at their discretion, of the
undisclosed, .r parte declarations of trust deposited in the portfolio of the
particular trust involved, and the substitution of other declarations embracing
the new investments, with consequent convenience to the trustee in book-
keeping and savings to the beneficiary in transfer taxes." Furthermore,
Trust Co., 86 Misc. 392, 149 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Surr. Ct. 1914); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Burton, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1932, p. 1341, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.).
4. See Gilbert v. Welsch, 75 Ind. 557, 561 (1851).
5. St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Mlinn. 1, 88 N. NV. 256 (1901).
6. White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 5S9, 48 N. E. 128 (IS97) ; In re Long Island Loan
and Trust Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. Supp. 65 (2d Dep't 1904).
7. See 4 Boomr, op. 'cit. mupra note 2, § 862.
8. In re Adriance's Estate, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
In re Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 At!. 24S (1936); RPSTAYCM T, Tnusrs
(1935) § 179, Comment d.
9. See Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank
and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 565, 577, 186 At!. 543, 545, 550 (1936); Morris v.
Wallace, 3 Pa. 319, 322 (1846). But see Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 330, 19D S. V.
333, 344 (1916).
10. Record, p. 21, Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford
Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 553, 186 AtI. 543 (1936). At the present time
trust companies in Connecticut, according to information furnished the YAr.z LAw
JouaxAL by trust officers, are transferring straight mortgages held in their on names
to themselves in trust for named beneficiaries. Nothing has as yet been done with
respect to participation mortgages.
IL But see Chapter House Circle of The ing's Daughters v. Hartford Lat.
Bank and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 568, 186 AtL 543, 546 (1936); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Burton, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1932, p. 1341, col 3 (Sup. Ct.).
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any notice whatever of the fiduciary capacity would as a practical matter
require complete disclosure of the terms of the trust indenture upon any
subsequent sale; in the case of land, its recordation as held in trust for
certain beneficiaries, without specification of the terms of the indenture,
as suggested by the Connecticut court, 2 would, by putting subsequent
purchasers on notice as to facts not on the record, place a cloud on titles
which might restrict subsequent transfers. By the same token the confi-
dential character of the trust relationship which both parties generally prefer
to maintain would be prejudiced.13
Of further importance to the beneficiaries is the fact that disclosure of
the trusteeship would render investments for individual trusts in partici-
pation mortgages of any size virtually impossible.1 4 The absence of a pro-
cedure for the separate recordation of participation interests in a single
mortgage would necessitate the recordation of the mortgage by the trustee
with the names and the pro rata shares of all the trusts funds participating,
and the administrative detail and expense involved in the rerecording of
the entire mortgage upon each exchange of a fi.ctional interest between
shares would be prohibitive. In addition, disclosure of each participating
interest upon recordation of the mortgage might entail a sacrifice of control
of the investment by the trustee which would be of doubtful legality.16 Upon
teimination of a particular trust which has shared in a participation the
trustee frequently finds it necessary to give the beneficiary the participating
certificates themselves instead of absorbing them in some other trust port-
folio.' 6 Under the previous practice these certificates represented merely
a'contract right against the trustee, but, if they were recorded interests in
the land, their surrender by the trustee would transfer a joint share in the
control of the mortgage to the new holder.
12. See Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank
and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 569, 186 Atl. 543, 547 (1936). It is not clearly stated
whether recordation in the name of the trustee simply "as trustee" would suffice or
whether the names of the settler and beneficiaries are necessary as well. But the
court evidently meant the latter; for the decision is designed to protect beneficiaries,
and CoNx. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5019 provides that, when the word "trustee" alone
is used in the records without mention of the cestui, it shall not operate to prevent
a bona fide purchaser from taking title superior to that of any undisclosed beneficiary.
13. But see Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank
and Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 568, 186 Atl. 543, 547. The court's argument that con-
cealment of the terms of the trust indenture cannot be very important, since it is the
general practice of corporate trustees in Connecticut to register investments in stock
certificates as held for a particular trust, loses sight, however, of the fact that stock
ownership lists are not public, while land records are.
14. For a complete discussion of participation mortgages see Comment, Participa-
tion Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investiment by Corporate Fiduciaries (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 857. New York has since repealed its statute permitting investment in
participations by trust companies. N. Y. BANKING LAw § 188(7).
'15. See Comment, supra note 14, at 875.
16. Id: at 865, n. 33.
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The requirement of disclosure would likewise complicate investment in
stock certificates. Since there can be no delivery under the rules of the
New York Stock Exchange of stocks registered by the seller in trust,' it
has been the usual practice of trust companies to buy the certificLtes as
trustee, but immediately to transfer all stocks to nominees, generally officers
of the companies, who then hold marketable title in their individual names
to the certificates actually belonging to the trust.18 Even if the stock were
held for a long period of time in the name of the trustee and the nominees
were dispensed with, it would still be necessary before a sale to transfer
the certificate to a nominee or to a broker who would take it in his owen
name. This might constitute a technical breach of trust, unless such a tem.-
porary transfer were excused as a necessary incident of the trustee's power
to sell. At the same time, in place of the present system which permits a
quick sale of the securities by the nominee, there would be a delay while
the trustee established to the satisfaction of the stock transfer agent that
it had authority to transfer the certificates to the nominee or the broker. 0
In short, holding stock certificates in the name of the trustee might well
entail a sacrifice of market position and still fail to eliminate a technical
breach of fiduciary duty.
Since participation mortgages and stock certificates are two of the princi-
pal forms of investment for small trust funds, the application of the equity
rules requiring disclosure of the fiduciary capacity in the instant case may
be ill-advised, at least as to corporate trustees otherwise supervised.2 0 Pro-
tection of beneficiaries in the name of first principles may be carried to the
point where the putative increase in security does not compensate for the
loss of income due to the trustee's inability to place the trust funds in the
more lucrative types of investment. The solution seems to lie in careful
legislation extending the regulation of trustees, and validating investment,
at least in participation mortgages and stock certificates, in the name of
those corporate trustees meeting certain designated standards of securityY-
If, in the absence of such legislation, the trustee were held for all investment
17. New York Stock Exchange Directory and Guide, p. E-7, rule 27 (1934).
18. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Burton, N. Y. L, J., Oct. 6, 1932, p. 1341,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) ; 6 BTG0srr, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1189(8).
19. There might be some question whether an indemnity bond to protect the transfer
agent against liability for wrongful transfer of the certificates would be enforceable if
the agent knew the trustee had no such authority. Cf. Delafield v. Barret, 270 N.Y.
43, 50, 200 N.E. 67, 70 (1936) (dissent).
20. For bank inspections see REv. STAT. §5240 (1875), amended, 18 STAT. 32-9
(1913), 12 U.S. C. § 481 (1934) ; CoNzr. Guz. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1436c. But see
Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
121 Conn. 558, 567, 186 AUt. 543, 546 (1936).
21. Such standards might include the edstence of adequate bonding to protect
beneficiaries against loss, complete internal records showing the separate interest of
each trust at all times, the giving of notice to beneficiaries whenever such an invest-
ment is made, the preservation of equality of lien in all participating mortgage shares
and the maintenanc& of direct control of the investment by the trustee.
19361 NOTES
326 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.46
losses, whether the result of the current practice or not, a choice would have
to be made between abandonment of desirable forms of investment and
insistence by the trustee on complete exoneration either from the settlor or
from the beneficiary. In place of the absence of protection for the cestui
which is the tendency of exculpatory clauses in trust indentures,22 control
through legislative action would secure a maximum of safety for the cestui
together with ample freedom for intelligent investment by the reputable
trustee.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT*
WHETHER a particular act is called a civil or a criminal contempt of court
determines the contemnor's liability to removal for trial,' his right to a
pardon by the chief executive,2 the type ofpenalty imposed,3 the availability
of certain defenses, 4 the method of review5 and the applicable Statute of
22. See Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments (1933) 42 YALE L. J.
359; Comment (1936) 46 id. 97, 109.
*McCann v. N. Y. Stock Exchange, 80 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
1. One guilty of criminal contempt of a federal court may be removed for trial
from any district where he is found to the district in which the contempt has been
committed. In re Ellerbe, 13 Fed. 530 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); cf. Mitchell v. Dexter,
244 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917). This is not so in cases of civil contempt. It re
Graves, 29 Fed. 60 (N. D. Iowa 1886). See Barrett, Contempt in Federal Courts (1911)
72 CENT. L. J. 5.
2. The right exists in cases of criminal contempt. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S.
87 (1925); Ex parte Magee, 31 N.M. 276, 242 Pac. 332 (1925). Contra: State v.
Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164 N. E. 408 (1928); see Johnston, Conslitutional Power to
Pardon Contempts of Court (1909) 12 LAWv NoTES 185. But its extension to civil
contempt is denied. In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); People v. Peters,
305 Ill. 223, 137 N.E. 118 (1922).
1 3. A definite brison sentence or a fine payable to the state may be imposed only for
criminal contempt. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911);
Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N. E. 313 (1932). Contra: Rothschild & Co. v.
Steger Piano Mfg. Co., 256 Il1. 196, 99 N. E. 920 (1912) ; N. Y. JUDiCrARy LAW § 774.
Compulsion or compensation, on the other hand, is the proper remedy for civil contempt.
State v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930); McNealey v. Rouse, 264 S. W. 383
(Mo. 1924), (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 921. Both types of punishment, however, may be
imposed in the same proceedings for the same act if the procedure has been criminal.
Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911). But see State v.
Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 332, 187 N. W. 830, 845 (1922).
4. See notes 7, 8, 9, infra.
5. Formerly no court reviewed the contempt proceedings of another. Ex parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U. S. 1822) ; see RAPALjE, CONTEMPT (1884) § 141. But in most
jurisdictions criminal contempt is now reviewable, generally by writ of error. Bessette
v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324 (1904) ; Brimson v. State, 63 Ohio St. 347, 58 N. E. 803
(1900). Contra: Fla., C. & P. R. R. v. Williams, 45 Fla. 295, 33 So. 991 (1903); Kelly
v. Montebello Park Co., 141 Md. 194, 118 AtI. 600 (1922). The purging of a criminal
Limitations.6 Thus, action in good faith upon advice of counsel,7 when the
prosecution for contempt is based upon the violation of an injunction, or,
in some jurisdictions, a mere oath of innocence s when- the act has been
committed outside of the court room, is a good defense to an attachment
for criminal contempt, but does not relieve the accused of responsibility on
a civil charge.9 Practically the only similarity between the two types of
contempt proceedings is the liability of the accused in either case to be
subjected to summary punishment without trial by jury, 0 save where such
procedure is prohibited by statute," or where the contempt has not been
committed in the presence of the court; in the latter case, where evidence
must be taken to establish the contempt, the court's summary powers have
been curtailed to the extent that the accused must be presumed to be inno-
cent,"- need not testify against himself' 3 and must be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt'L4-requirements which assume additional significance in
contempt, however, is generally not reviewable. Wingert v. Kieffer, 29 F. (2d) 59
(C. C. A. 4th, 1928); see RAPALJE, op. cit. supra, § 146. Contra: State v. Mullan, I8
IowNa 794, 171 N. W. 158 (1919). Civil contempt, on the other hand, is generally review-
able by appeal. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217 (1932) ; Vilter Mfg., Co. v. Humphrey,
132 Wis. 587, 112 N. W. 1095 (1907).
6. Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604 (1914).
7. Matthews v. Spangenberg, 15 Fed. 813 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1833); Proudfit
Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., 230 Fed. 120 (C. C.A. 6th,
1916); see RAPAiE, CoNTmipr (1884) §49. Contra: In re LaVarre, 48 F. (2d) 216
(S. D. Ga. 1930).
S. People v. Northup, 279 Ill. App. 129 (1935), (1935) 26 J. Cr . LAw 123;
Zuver v. State, 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E. 828 (1919) ; see Curtis and Curtis, The Story
of a Notion ih the Law of Criminal Contempt (1927) 41 HAv. L RV. 51.
9. Matthews v. Spangenberg, 15 Fed. 813 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1833); In re Cooley,
95 N. 3. Eq. 485, 125 At. 486 (Ch. 1924), off'd, 103 N. J. Eq. 377, 143 At. 916 (1928);
see RAPALJE, CozuprTr (1884) §49.
10. Statutes requiring jury trials have, in fact, been held unconstitutional. Walton
Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920) ; Carter v. Commonwealth,
96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780 (1899). See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610
(1914) (" . . . trial by jury . .. has been thought not to extend to them [contempts]
as a matter of right.").
11. 38 STAT. 739 (1914), 28 U.S.C. §387 (1934); PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936)
tit. 17, §2047. These statutes are constitutional. Michaelson v. United States, 265
U.S. 42 (1924); Pa. Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pa., 318 Pa. 401,
178 AtL 291 (1935), (1935) 14 Nan. L. Bur. 184; see Frankfurter & Landis, Powr
of Congress over Procedure in Crimbnal Contecnpts in "Infcrior" Fedcral Courts (1924)
37 HARv. L. REv. 1010.
12. People v. Spain, 307 IlL 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923) ; see Michaelson v. United
States, 266 U. S. 42, 66 (1924).
13. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 41S (1911); Root v.
MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N. E. 684 (1927).
14. Sabin v. Fogarty, 70 Fed. 482 (C. C. D. Wash. 1895); Ivens v. Empire Floor
& Wall Tile Co., 119 N. 3. Eq. 273, 182 At!. 255 (Ch. 1936). But see People v. Mus-
satto, 216 Ill. App. 519, 527 (1920).
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view of the rule that no criminal punishment may be imposed except in
criminal proceedings.'0
Yet, despite these serious differences consequent upon the classification,
civil and criminal contempts have never been satisfactorily distinguished.
Under the conventional rule of thumb, contempts that strike at the court's
discipline are said to be criminal, while those that interfere with the rights
or remedies of private parties arising in the course of litigation are said to
be civil. 10 There is little doubt that such an act as an assault upon the judge
is a criminal contempt.' 7 But a refusal to comply with a court order, while
ordinarily considered civil,' s is said, if carried to the point of "contumacy,"
to become criminal.' 9 The location of this point in terms of particular
acts of contempt is virtually impossible. The method of initiating prose-
cutions, often suggested as a canon for distinguishing the two types of
contempts, 20 has been an ineffective guide. Since the court's knowledge
of the violation of an order which has not been committed in the presence
of the court itself generally comes from one of the parties to the suit, the
prosecution even for criminal contempt is often undertaken by the party
in whose favor the order has been issued ;21 but the complaining party
seldom states clearly whether he desires an attachment for civil or for crimi-
nal contempt. Other tests have been attempted. One criterion would make
the nature of the order violated determinative: if the contemnor refuses to
do an act he has been ordered to do, he is guilty of civil contempt and a
coercive or remedial penalty will be imposed; if, on the other hand, he does
an act which he has been forbidden to do and is, therefore, unable to restore
the status quo, he has committed a criminal contempt and a vindictive penalty
will be inflicted.22 This test seems fatally superficial in that it enables the
judge to phrase the order either negatively or positively, depending upon
whether or not he wishes to impose criminal punishment and to deprive the
complainant of his right to compensation should a violation occur. Another
view would regard the contempt as criminal only if the contemnor has not
15. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Denny v. State,
203 Ind. 682, 182 N. E. 313 (1932).
16. Hendryx v. Fitzpatrick, 19 Fed. 810 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884); In re Nevitt, 117
Fed. 448 (C.C.A. 8th, 1902); see Comment (1933) 8 law. L. Rnv. 492; (1923)
36 HA.v. L. REv. 617.
17. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S. W. 466 (1921).
18. Lane v. Alexander, 168 Ark. 700, 271 S. W. 710 (1925).
19. Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911); see Bessette
v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 329 (1904).
20. Wakefield v. Housel, 288 Fed. 712 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Denny v. State, 203
Ind. 682, 182 N. E. 313 (1932).
21. Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324 (1904); Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass.
344, 157 N. E. 684 (1927); Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' & Mason
Plasterers' Internat'l Union, 200 App. Div. 714, 193 N. Y. Supp. 368 (4th Dep't 1922).
22. Reeder v. Morton-Gregson Co., 296 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Lester v.
People, 150 IlL. 408, 37 N.E. 1004 (1890); Phil'ips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187 (1876);
State v. Knight, 3 S. D. 509, 54 N. W. 412 (1893).
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been a party to the suit in which the injunction has been issued.2 But,
since it is not necessarily true that the contempt is civil if the contemnor
has been such a party, this proposition seems to indicate a reluctance to
punish those persong neither named nor served in injunction proceedings
rather than any distinction between acts of civil and acts of criminal con-
tempt. Realizing that the distinction rests "in shadow," 241 many courts have
determined the nature of the contempt proceedings by resort to formalities
like the title of the proceedings, 5 the nature of the relief sought, -G the fact
that the contemnor has or has not testified,27 the person who has conducted
the prosecution and the party to whom the fine has been ordered paid.cu
Because of the variety of the criteria and of the fact that most jurisdictions
have refused to adhere to any particular one,30 results in this field have
been unpredictable, thus defeating the purpose of the tests, which is to
inform the accused at the outset with which contempt he is charged a '
A recent case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
attempts a clarification of the problem. In order to prevent the plaintiff's
continued harassment of the defendants and their attorneys with abusive
leaflets during the pendency of a suit, the defendants secured an injunction
prohibiting the circulation among them or their counsel of "any threatening
or derogatory communications.' Following the receipt of another such
leaflet, the plaintiff, upon motion of the defendants and hearing, was ad-
judged in contempt and ordered to pay a fine of $250 to the United States.
The Circuit Court reversed on appeal on the ground that the contempt
proceedings, which were civil, could rlot support the criminal penalty im-
posed, and, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, prescribed the general
rule that contempt proceedings should be considered civil and, therefore,
support none but remedial, as opposed to vindictive, punishment unless
prosecuted either by the district attorney or by the court, which might act
23. Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324 .(1904); Hammond Lumber Co. v.
Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 167 Fed. 809 (C. C. N.D. Cal. 1909). Contra: O'Brien
v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. F. 103 (1905).
24. See Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 358, 157 N. F. 6S4, 6S8 (1927).
25. See note 20, mt.ra.
26. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217 (1932) ; in ro Nevitt, 117 Fed. 44S (C. C. A.
8th, 1902).
27. Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 Fed. 926 (C. C.A. 1st4 1917); Wakefield v. Housel,
288 Fed. 712 (C.C.A. 8th, 1923).
28. In. re Kahn, 204 Fed. 581 (C. C.A. 2d, 1913); In re Guzzardi, 74 F. (2d)
671 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935).
29. Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N. . 313 (1932); Eastern Concrete Steel
Co. v. Bricklayers' & Mason Plasterers' Internat'l Union, 200 App. Div. 714, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 368 (4th Dep't 1922).
30. Compare, e.g., the following cases in the Second Circuit itself: In re Kahn,
204 Fed. 581 (C.C.A. 2d, 1913) (title of proceedings, nature of relief sought and
person who conducted prosecution); Bradstreet Co. v. Bradstreet's Collection Bureau,
249 Fed. 958 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) (title of proceedings); In re Guzzardi, 74 F. (2d)
671 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935) (nature of relief sought and person who conducted prosecution).
31. See McCann v. N. Y. Stock Exchange, S0 F. (2d) 211, 214 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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without assistance of counsel or through an attorney of one of the parties
directed to prosecute by an order entered in ijinne and duly served on the
contemnor.
3 2
This rule, in view of its administrative definiteness and ease of applica-
tion, should go far to mitigate the prevailing confusion. Although it does
not pretend to determine when a civil contempt has been carried to the
point of "contumacy". so as to become criminal, it renders that problem
largely academic from the viewpoint of the litigant who desires to press a
contempt charge; for it limits him to a civil prosecution unless he convinces
either the district attorney or the court that it is proper or expedient to
proceed criminally. This disability of the complainant to .prosecfte for
criminal contempt on his own volition should obviate the necessity of resort-
ing to the vagueness of the distinctions between the two types of contempt
in order to keep the trial court's power of summary punishment within
its theoretical bounds.33 And at the same time the purely formal character
of the rule should result in a gradual definition of civil and criminal contempt
of court in terms of specific acts.
THE EXTENT OF MUNIcIPAL HoImE RULE IN NEW YoRx*
LARGER powers for local governing units have been provided in the munici-
pal home rule clauses of sixteen state constitutions.' Provisions thus made
for local autonomy relieve a distant and often disinterested legislature from
32. McCann v. N. Y. Stock Exchange, 80 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
The court also held that the act of sending the leaflet was not in itself punishable as
a contempt. It was' indicated, moreover, that the injunction was erroneous, but the
court refused to express an opinion as to whether or not it would be an abuse of the
court's power to inflict a penalty for the violation of an erroneous order. Cf. (1935)
49 HARv. L. REv. i47; (1934) 12 N. C. L. Rev. 258.
33. The so-called power to punish summarily for criminal contempt, which is said
to inhere in all courts because of the necessity of self-preservation, is neither historically
nor theoretically a power to punish, but rather a power to remove obstructions to the
administration of justice, and should be exercised only so far as is necessary in order
that the legal process may proceed. Fox, THE HISTORY oF CONTEMPT or CouRT (1927);
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 11; Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for
Contempt (1931) 31 CoL L. Rev. 956.
*In the Matter of Edward 3. Mooney v. S. Howard Cohen et. al., 272 N. Y. 33
(1936), N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1936, p. 1127, col. 1.
1. Aiuz. CoNsr. art. IX (1912), art. XIII (1910); CAL. CONST. art. XI (1879);
CoLo. Cortsr. art. XX (1912); MD. CoxsT. art. XIA (1915); MIcH. ConsT. art. VIII
(1912); MnNr. CoNsT. art. IV (1898); Mo. CoxsT. art. IX (1875); NED. CONST.
art. XI (1912); N. Y. CoxsT. art. XII (1923); OHIO CoNsT. art. XVIII (1912);
OKA.A. CoNsT. art. XVIII (1907); ORE. CoNsT. art. XI (1906); PA. CoNsTr. art XV
(1922); TEx. Coxs'r. art. XI (1909); WAsn. CoNsT. art. XI (1889); Wis. CoxsT.
art. XI (1924). For a compilation of home rule provisions, see McGoLDMCX, THE
LAw AND PRAcTIcE oF MUxcPAL HOME Ruzz (1933) 353 et seq.
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the necessity of solving unfamiliar local problems. Moreover it was hoped
that by curtailing the power of the legislature to direct special legislation at
particular cities, leaving it only the power to enact statutes of general appli-
cation, the spectacle of powerful municipal lobbies necessary both to gain
favorable, and to oppose harmful legislation would disappear.2
Legislative encroachments and judicial interpretation have both weakened
the effectiveness of experiments in home rule.3 Thus the New York con-
stitution grants no power directly to the cities, but instead provides that
the legislature shall carry the home rule provision into effect by general
law, a form of home rule provision particularly susceptible to legislative
infringement.4 The legislature was thereby afforded an opportunity to grant
broad or limited power to the cities as its own discretion dictated, and the
powers actually delegated by the legislature were sufficiently circumscribed
to insure the retention of considerable state control over certain fields of
municipal activity.5 Municipal autonomy has been further weakened in
New York by judicial interpretation of the vague terms employed in both
the home rule amendment and the enabling acts. For example, the pro-
vision that the powers of the legislature to act in relation to matters other
than the property, affairs or government of cities shall in" no way be abridged,
has been narrowly construed by the courts. As a result legislative action has
been consistently upheld to the exclusion of local control where any matter
of state concern was remotely involved.0
2. McGoLDRicEc, op. cit. mpra note 1, at 2-4; 1 McQunmz, M mcrA,.. Co0.RA-
TioNs (2d ed. 1928) §§93, 107, 265; Comment (1929) 39 YAu L. 3. 92, 93; BroolS,
Metropolitan Free Cities (1915) 30 PoL. Scr. Q. 222.
3. The difficulty in clearly defining the limits of state and local control has resulted
in general grants to the cities and correlative restrictions on the legislatures, which,
by their uncertainty, afford opportunities for legislative interference. See lfcGormrhcv,
op. cit. stpra note 1, at 310. The demand for judicial construction of these vague terms
has placed the burden of defining the extent of home rule upon the courts. Id. at 305.
4. N. Y. CoNsr. art. XII, §§ 2-5.
5. City Home Rule Law N. Y. Cons. LAWS .(Cahil 1930) c. 6a amended N. Y.
Cons. LAWS (Cahill 1931-35 Supp.) c. 6a. Certain matters were excluded from local
consideration entirely; others required a referendum; a third group were subject to
a referendum on petition; and all local laws must have the approval of the mayor.
See Cardozo, J., in Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 125, 149 N.E. 211,
220 (1925).
6. Thus cities have been denied the powers to determine local boundaries [City
of New York v. Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929)], to regulate the
salaries of judges [Schieffelin v. Leary, 219 App. Div. 660, 220 N. Y. Supp. 5S7 (Ist
Dep't 1927)], to alter the retirement age for local pensions (Schieffelin v. Berry, 217
App. Div. 451, 216 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dep't 1926)], to set the time and manner
of electing local officers [Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 51
(1927)], to make regulations for multiple dwellings [Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y.
467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929); Comment (1929) 39 YAca L. 3. 92; Keane, The MultipIc
Dwelling Law Decision (1929) 4 ST. JoHnt's L. REv. 45], to operate a municipal bus
line [Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211 (1925)], or control
rapid transit within city limits [Mlatter of.AcAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y.
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In New York direct interference with the property, affairs or govern-
ment of individual cities is permissible only by way of general laws applicable
to all cities,7 or by special legislation for particular cities if enacted by a
two-thirds majority of both houses after an emergency message from the
governor.8 A recent case9 illustrates how effectively special legislation can
qualify the home rule supposedly assured to municipalities by the state con-
stitution. A taxpayer of the city of Nev York wag denied a mandamus
by which he sought to compel the Board tof Elections to refrain from sub-
mitting to the electorate a referendum on a new city charter. The legislature
by a special emergency act1 ° had authorized the mayor to appoint a com-
mission to draft the revised charter. It was contended that since the home
rule amendment expressly required that its provisions be carried into effect
by general laws and since the legislature had, in accord with this direction,
granted to the cities the power to initiate charter reform, 1 the legislature
was powerless to withdraw this grant as to a particular city by a special
law. The court, however, had no difficulty disposing of this argument, since
377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922) ; McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849 (1926).
But see Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor, 152 N. Y. 257, 273, 46 N. E.
499, 503 (1897); International Ry. Co. v. Rann, 224 N. Y. 83, 90, 120 N.E. 153, 155
(1918)1.
7. It had been the practice in many states and in New York prior to the home
rule amendment to permit classification of cities to such an extent that this type of
restriction was avoided. McGorulcix, op. cit. supra note 1, at 276. The Matter of the
New York Elevated R. R., 70 N. Y. 327 (1877) ; In the Matter of the Application of
Church, 92 N. Y. 1 (1883); Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954 (1891);
Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N. Y. 377, 54 N. E. 1081 (1899); Admiral
Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241 (1912); Holbrook, Cabot
and Rollins Corp. v. City of New York, 277 Fed. 852 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
Where, however, the classification constituted designation of particular cities, the
courts refused to uphold the statutes. In re Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 50 N. E. 61
(1898). After the passage of the home rule amendment in New York, the courts were
relieved of much of the confusion previously encountered, since by the constitution a
general law must apply to all cities alike both in its terms and its effect. Scheffelin
v. McLaughlin, 127 Misc. 56, 215 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Re Mayor of City
of New York (Elm St.), 246 N. Y. 72, 158 N. E. 24 (1927); City of New York v.
Fifth Avenue Coach Co., 237 App. Div. 383, 262 N. Y. Supp. 228 (1st Dep't 1933),
aff'd without opinion, 262 N. Y. 481, 188 N. E. 29 (1933).
8.- N. Y. Coisr. art. XII, § 2. In practice this provision has proved a negligible
restriction upon the legislature as the amendment fails to define "emergency", permitting
the governor to grant such a declaration as a matter of courtesy. Furthermore it is
said that a two-thirds majority is readily obtained on measures affecting local matters,
especially where the issue is nonpartisan. See McGoLDmicl, op. cit. supra note 1, at
269; McGoLnrcx, What Municipal Home Ride Mecans Today: X New York (1932)
21 NAT. MUN. Rv. 671.
9. In the Matter of Edward J. Mooney v. S. Howard Cohen et. al., 272 N. Y.
33 (1936), N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1936, p. 1127, col. 1.
10. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 867 as amended -by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 292.
11. City Home Rule Law N. Y. Cois. LAws (Cahill 1930) c. 6a amended N. Y.
CONs. LA-ws (Cahill 1931-35 Supp.) c. 6a, §20.
NOTES
the amendment placed only procedural restrictions on the legislature's use
of special laws. Petitioner further maintained that, if the legislative act
were proper under the home rule provisions of the constitution, it was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in that it created a citizen's
commission to draft the charter and empowered the people of New York City
to perform the legislative function of enacting a charter by means of a
referendum. Plaintiff assumed that the commission was an agency of the
state legislature. In the opinion of the court, however, the commission was
a local agency vested with municipal legislative power for the limited pur-
pose of drafting a new charter, and since the court found no requirement in
the constitution that the legislative power of a city be in any particular
body, and since it considered the commission an appropriate recipient of
the power if the legislature saw fit to select it,. the legislative delegation to
the city was held not to be improper.
The decision illustrates the illusory character of home rule in New York.
It is now evident that the legislature may create local agencies for purely
municipal purposes, determine their personnel, and transfer the legislative
power previously granted a city to the bodies so formed. The City of New
York had in 1933 expressed its disapproval of altering the charter in a
referendum provided for that purpose in the enabling act, but the legisla-
ture by a special act compelled the city to exercise the limited choice of
voting for or against the adoption of a charter the contents of which it could
not control. Under the present home rule provisions,13 the legislature of
NeW York could by further general statutes extend the grant of power to
the cities so as to approximate the home rule apparently secured in other
states, but in view of the powers reserved to the legislature by the amend-
ment, local legislation, though properly within the bounds of municipal
powers, could still be superseded when the legislature decided to interfere.
If more complete home rule is to be an object of political policy,'- it can
be assured only through changes in the home rule amendment further restrict-
ing the legislature's interference in local matters.
12. It is true that a complete law may be enacted by the legislature and presented
to the people for adoption in a locality. Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 (18S3) ; Bank
of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863); Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y.
605 (1864); People ex. rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. . 442, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 626 (1913); Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 222 NT. Y. 159, 113 N. .
500, re'g 179 App. Div. 954, 166 N. Y. Supp. 286 (4th Dep't 1917), holding that the
legislature has the power to enact a complete charter for a city and make its adoption
dependent upon acceptance by the city in a referendum. But no complete law was
involved in the instant case as the commission, if acting for the state legislature, could
not perform that legislative function. See Tooke, The Arcw Yorh City Charter Com-
-nissimo (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. R-v. 50, 54.
13. N. Y. CoNs?. art. XII, § 5.
14. The advisability of a change of that sort may be questioned since there are
occasions when the reserve power of the legislature to interfere with local concerns
may be in the best interests of the cities, as when a strong political machine directs
the policies of the municipality.
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DISABILITY OF MORTGAGEE TO ASSERT UNENCUMBERED TAX TITLE
AGAINST OTHER LIENORS*
IF A TAX deed always conveyed title to property clear of all past encum-
brances,' it would be possible for delinquent owners to extinguish outstand-
ing encumbrances by a repurchase of their property at a tax sale. The rule
formulated to prevent manipulation of this kind is, as generally stated, that
one who owes to another the duty of paying taxes to the governing unit,
cannot strengthen his title by means of a tax default.2 If a person subject
to such a duty does purchase a tax deed after default, his purchase is con-
sidered to be only a redemption of the old title, as when a mortgagor claims
under a tax deed against his mortgagee,3 or a lessee, who has contracted
to pay the taxes, claims against his lessor.4 In a recent case involving
mortgaged property delinquent for both general taxes and drainage district
assessments, the county first accepted a certificate of sale0 in payment of
*Hadlock v. Benjamin Drainage Dist., 53 P. (2d) 1156 (Utah 1936).
1. Under the general rule, clear title is conveyed thereby. 3 Coogmr, TAXATION
(4th ed. 1924) § 1490 et seq. The basis for this drastic treatment of subordinate liens
lies in the policy of facilitating purchase of lands at tax sales so that property will
not long remain off the assessment rolls.
2. 3 CooLEY, TAXATiON § 1437. Cooley thus limits the rule to duties owed to
another, yet the limitation seems based not on principle but on the fact that the reported
cases on the point, concerned only with legal duties owed to another individual, have not
required a broader statement. It would seem inequitable, however, to permit one
who owes a duty of paying taxes, regardless of to whom the duty is owed, to profit,
after neglecting that obligation, by a purchase of an unencumbered tax deed. Black-
well v. Kinney, 119 Ark. 578, 180 S.W. 757 (1915); Stewart v. Elliot, 63 Kan. 851,
66 Pac. 986 (1901); see BLAcic, TAx T TLus (1888) § 137. In some states it is the
law that one who is under apy moral or legal obligation to pay taxes is disabled to
assert a tax title against another. Cf. Christy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 256 (1881); Bald-
win v. Barber, 164 Wis. 622, 160 N.W. 1052 (1917). In view of the purpose of the
rule, such a broad statement of it is desirable and obviates the difficulties discussed
at pp. 336-7 infra.
3. Manning v. Bonard, 87 Iowa 648, 54 N.W. 459 (1893); Toliver v. Stephenson,
83 Neb. 747, 120 N.W. 450 (1909).
4. Hurt v. Schneider, 61 Colo. 104, 156 Pac. 600 (1916); Christhilf v. Bollman,
114 Md. 477, 79 Atl. 208 (1911).
5. Hadlock v. Benjamin Drainage Dist., 53 P. (2d) 1156 (Utah 1936).
6. Tax sale procedure varies from state to state, but the typical procedure is as
follows: The purchaser at a tax sale is given a certificate of sale according him a
form of inchoate title which ripens into an indefeasible fee in the absence of any
redemption of the old title. The power to redeem is possessed by all parties having
a legal interest in the property and is exercised by payment of the delinquent taxes
to a designated official within a specified time limit. When this power is exercised,
the holder of the certificate of sale receives the amount spent for the certificate plus
interest; but vhen the power of redemption is allowed to lapse, the certificate holder
is conveyed the unrestricted fee by a tax deed.
The Utah procedure at the time of the tax sale in 'the instant ease required that
the county alone take the certificate of sale. UTAu REV. STAT. ANx. (1933) § 80-10-32,
UTAz LAws (1921) § 6018. The power to redeem extended for four years as a matter
the general taxes alone, and then, after the redemption period had elapsed,
it received by auditor's deed a conveyance of the delinquent property clear
of all liens. -Thereafter the plaintiff, the mortgagee's assignee, secured, as
consideration for a release of the mortgage debt, a quitclaim deed to the
mortgagor's interests,8 and subsequently, by payment of a sum equivalent
to the amount of the delinquent general taxes, obtained from the county a
quitclaim deed to its interests in the property. The plaintiff, contending that
these transactions had conferred clear and absolute title upon him, brought
an action to remove the cloud of the assessment lien claimed for the drain-
age district. It was held, however, that the seeming purchase of the tax
deed was merely a redemption of the mortgagor's title, thus preserving the
drainage district's lien. The Chief Justice, concurring, agreed that the plain-
tiff's transaction with the county was in fact a redemption, but asserted that
even if it were intended as a purchase, the plaintiff was under a duty to pay
taxes, first as mortgagee and later as a holder of the mortgagor's interests,
and was for that reason unable to purchase a clear title. Two justices dis-
sented separately.
The lien of the drainage district would be considered to survive -the tax
sale if plaintiff's payment to the county is viewed as an exercise of the con-
ditional power of redemption which he, as successor in interest to the mort-
gagor, possessed at the time of the transaction. The evidence on this issue
is not decisive.9 If, on the other hand, the transaction is called a purchase
of the tax title and not a redemption, the land in question would be un-
encumbered by the drainage lien'0 unless it can b6 shown that the relation-
ship of the plaintiff to the old title was such as to disqualify him as a
purchaser of perfect title. It is arguable that a disability to cut off lieng
by purchase should be imposed because of the plaintiff's position as suc-
cessor in interest to the mortgagor, but the cases uniformly hold that the
owner in possession may purchase a tax deed based on the default of his
of right and at the expiration of this period the county was to be given an auditor's
deed which conveyed the land to it free of the liens on the old title. By virtue of
an unique Utah statute, however, parties formerly interested still possessed after the
four year period the possibility of a redemption, but conditional upon the acquiescence
of the county commissioners. UrTA Rev. STAT. Ainy. (1933) § E0-10-6S, Ums LAws
(1921) §6056.
7. See Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 440, 46 P. (2d) 400, 407 (1935).
8. The mortgagor's interest at that time consisted of a conditional power to redeem.
See note 6, supra.
9. The quitclaim deed conveyed the entire estate of the county which consisted of
an unrestricted fee, but the resolution of the commissioners authorizing the :sale spEcifi-
cally stated that the county taxes were to be released, thus giving color to the argument
of redemption. The commissioners also ordered that the deed comply with two statutes
which regulate redemption, yet inconsistently authorized the issuance 6f a deed and
not the usual certificate of redemption. Although a determination that the transaction
was actually a redemption would obviate discussion of the problems involved in the
disqualification of an intended purchaser of clear title, the facts of the instant case are
not clear enough to justify that conclusion.
10. See Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 440, 46 P. (2d) 400, 407 (1935).
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assignor and thus extinguish all prior liens," even tax liens, 2- since dis-
qualification to take unfettered title through a tax sale is said to be based
upon a breach of duty to pay taxes, and since an assignee is held to be free
of a duty to pay taxes levied against his assignor.13 Furthermore, the de-
cisions allowing a successor in interest to purchase are reinforced in the
principal suit by a Utah statute14 conferring upon a tax the effect of a
personal judgment.'5 This precludes a delegation of the duty to pay the
tax without the consent of the county.
The contention is more persuasive that the plaintiff should be prevented
from purchasing a new title because of his position as mortgagee at the
time of the tax levy. Ordinarily such a restraint is judicially imposed under
the rule which bars claims of unencumbered title by one who owes to
another the duty of paying taxes.'0 Since a mortgagee is usually not under
a legal obligation to other lienors to pay taxes, courts thus disqualifying him
as a purchaser of clear title must modify the rule so as to include within
its prohibition a duty owed to the public that taxes be paid, 17 and then find
11. Security Mortgage Co. v. Herron, 174 Ark. 698, 296 S.W. 363 (1927) (second
mortgagee who purchased interests of delinquent owner allowed to destroy first mort-
gage lien); Oswald v. Wolf, 129 Ill. 200, 21 N.E. 839 (1899) (easement extinguished
by assignee's purchase of tax deed for taxes delinquent before the assignment) ; 'Davis
v. Allen, 224 Mass. 551, 113 N.E. 364 (1916) (assignee's tax deed superior to subse-
quent sheriff's deed); Lybrand v. Haney, 31 Wis. 230 (1872) (assignee quiets title
against former owner); see 3 Coormz, TAXATi N § 1438.
12. Raquette Falls Land Co. v. State, 124 Misc. 300, 207 N.Y. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl.
1925) (assignee of delinquent lands extingnishes state tax lien by purchase of tax deed
for later year).
13. It is emphasized by the concurring opinion in the instant case that the plaintiff
took the deed from the mortgagor "subject to" unpaid taxes. These words, imposing
no positive duty upon the grantee, are usually interpreted merely as a recital of the
parties' understanding that the assignee is to have no recourse against the grantor
in the event of an execution of a lien for delinquent taxqs. Raquette Falls Land Co
v. State, 124 Misc. 300, 207 N.Y. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl. 1925). See also Jager v. Vol-
linger, 174 Mass. 521, 523, 55 N.E. 458, 459 (1899); Cox v. Butts, 48 Okl. 147,
151, 149 Pac. 1090, 1091 (1915).
14. UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 80-10-1; Couxp. LAws, UTAH (1917) § 5995.
15. In this connection, however, it might have been contended that plaintiff was
under a duty to pay taxes as assignee taking "subject to" taxes, in that the non-
payment of taxes would deprive him of his interest in the land. (Cf. discussion in fra
at p. 337, and note 20.]. This "duty" might disqualify him as purchaser of a clear title,
since it might be considered inequitable for him both to negotiate with his grantor
on the basis of the existence of valid liens, deducting the amount of the liens from
the purchase price, and then to destroy the liens through acquisition of the delinquent
realty at a tax sale.
16. See notes 18 and 19, infra. For a holding directly contra: Security Mortgage
Co. v. Herron, 174 Ark. 698, 296 S. W. 363 (1927).
17. Cf. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich. 113, 7 N. W. 707 (1881),
Des Moines Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisenmenger, 183 Minn. 46, 235 N. W. 390,
(1931) ; see Riley v. Bank of Commerce of Roswell, 37 N.M. 338, 342, 23 P. (2d)
362, 364 (1933).
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that the mortgagee is under such a duty. 8 A tax obligation due from the
mortgagee'0 to the public has been spelled out from the fact that a lien-
holder, like the mortgagor, is deprived by a tax sale of his entire interest in
the property2 0 But even if the imposition of a penalty for the non-payment
of taxes be considered sufficient basis for the inference of a duty to pay
them, the existence of a "duty" thus inferred should not be held, without
more, to disqualify every holder of a destructible interest in property from
purchasing a tax deed free of all liens.2 ' The recognition of a disability
to purchase an unencumbered tax title, an issue of policy and not of legal
rules, depends on a balancing of social interests that are far from dear;
certainly there is no basis for a blanket disqualification of all such lienors.
The limits of disqualification should be set by reference to the relative equities
of the classes of lienors" involved.2-
18. The same result might be reached in some cases by modifying the concept of
duty involved in the rule to include "moral" obligation, like the obligation to preserve
the status quo which, it is sometimes said, a mortgagee owes other lienors. Finding
such an obligation in a particular case would depend on the same analysis of con-
flicting equities which is decisive on the issue of disqualifying lienors as purchasers
of clear title. Cf. p. 338, infra. Fair v. Brown, 40 Iora 209 (1875); Woodbury v.
Swan, 59 N. IL 22 (1879); Hall v. Westcott, 15 R. L 373, 5 At. 629 (I36). The
second dissenting opinion in the instant case is based upon this attack which is there
assimilated to the doctrine of estoppel.
19. It may be argued that the plaintiff should have been permitted to purchase
because at the time he took the quitclaim deed from the county he, having relinquished
his lien, was not even a mortgagee. Although this divestiture of the mortgagee's in-
terests has been held [Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wickhem, 9 S.D. 341, 69 N. V. 14
(1896)] to justify his eligibility to take a tax deed, yet to permit purchase because
of this fact alone would allow easy evasion of the disability rule since the mortgagee
could then arrange to repurchase the deed from an accomplice 'who had taken it from
the county, and, in so doing, had destroyed the mortgage lien. Cf. WVilliams v. Campion,
53 N.D. 456, 206 N. W. 703 (1925); Wood v. Schwartz, 212 Iowa 462, 236 N. NM
491 (1931); (1931) 41 YALE L. 3. 1094.
20. The concept of a legal duty is indefinable, but most commentators would probably
agree that the mortgagee is here under a duty to pay the taxes. Corbin, Rights and
Duties (1924) 33 YALE L. 3. 501; Goble, The Sanction of a Ditty (1923) 37 Y.
L. J. 426, especially at p. 440. The problem is made difficult by the extraordinary
nature of the remedy. Although the mortgagee must pay the full amount of the taxes
in order to protect the lien, his failure to do so is penalized only to the extent of
loss of the lien and not the full amount of the delinquent taxes. But the extent and
nature of the penalty need not be coextensive with the duty. In some states, of course,
a duty to pay taxes is expressly imposed upon a mortgagee by statute. Cf. CA. Por.
CoDE (Deering 1931) §3617.
21. That courts do not carry this analysis to its logical e.xtreme is well illustrated
by the holdings in a single state. Wilson v. Jamison, 36 Mfina. 59, 29 N.W. S37 (126 ')
(holder of judgment lien can assert tax title against mortgagee); Reimer v. Nev:ell,
47 Minn. 237, 49 N.W. 865 (1891) (mortgagee can assert tax title against mort-
gagor) ; Norton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 484, 77 N. IM 293 (1898)
(second mortgagee cannot destroy lien of first mortgagee by purchase of tax. deed).
22. The taxing unit is not interested in the solution of the problem since in any
event it receives the delinquent taxes plus interest. Yet it has been argued that to
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In cases which consider the equities of disqualifying a lienor as a pur-
chaser, there has been considerable emphasis on the moral obligation con-
sidered to flow from the community of interest that lienors have in the
preservation of the title which supports their liens ;23 yet it may be countered
that, as between themselves, lienors' interests are antagonistic.2 ' Likewise
it can be argued that purchase by a mortgagee at a tax sale is possible only
after the other lienholders have failed to save their liens by redeeming the
old title, so that their discomfiture is the result of their own neglect.25
On the other hand, it seems inequitable to permit the mortgagee-purchaser
to assert a clear tax title at the expense of the other lienors when, if the
purchase of the tax deed were viewed as a redemption, the mortgagee, acquir-
ing a prior lien on the property to the amount expended in that redemption,20
would be placed in a position no worse than that. which he occupied prior
to the delinquency, while at the same time the other lienors would be
materially benefitted. The courts are particularly disturbed by the process
through which one who formerly had but a lien on the property obtains a
tax deed for a nominal sum and thereby destroys the liens of others. Not-
withstanding this element, which is probably more responsible than any other
for the disqualification of mortgagees as purchasers of unencumbered tax
title, certain factors persuasive of a different result obtained in the instant
case. It is particularly significant that the mutuality of disability to purchase,
which is said to be an important element in the determination of whether
a particular lienor is to be disqualified, is absent.27 Similarly, it is important
that the Utah statute clothing lienors with the power to purchase a tax
certificate before the expiration of the redemption period, impliedly con-
ferred this power after the termination of the redemption right and the
destruction of the mortgage lien.28 Apparently, however, the court'd desire
to protect the drainage lien was more compelling than these considerations.
permit the mortgagee to obtain new title might conceivably have the effect of accelerat-
ing tax payments by other lienors since they would no longer be able to rely on one
of their number to safeguard their interests.
23. Fair v. Brown, Woodbury v. Swan, both .supra note 18.
24. See dissenting opinion in Baird v. Fischer, 57 N.D. 167, 220 N. W. 892 (1928);
(1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 93.
25. Security Mortgage Co. v. Harrison, 176 Ark. 423, 3 S. W. (2d) 59 (1928).
26. 3 TiFFANY, REAL PRoPnRTY (2d ed. 1920) § 616. But see Lawyers Title &
Guarantee Co. v. Claven, 237 App. Div. 188, 260 N.Y. Supp. 847 (2d Dep't 1932)
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 971.
27. The same procedure is followed in the enforcement of drainage liens as that of
general taxes. UTAH Coup. LAWs (1917) §2058.
28. UTAH R v. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 80-10-36.
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TAxABILiTY op GRANTORS AS TO UDismTmBUTED TRusT IzicomE
THE TRUST was first treated as a separate entity for income tax purposes
in 19161 and has since proven to be a convenient device for minimizing
income tax levies.2 Congress has made several attempts to check such tax
avoidance, principally by means of the much amended Sections 166 and 167
of the Revenue Acts.3 Under the 1928 Revenue Act, Section 166 taxed
the grantor on the income of such part of the corpus of a trust as could
revest in him at any time during the taxable year; and Section 167 taxed
the grantor on income which in his discretion could be distributed, or held
or accumulated for future distribution to him. Although these Sections
clearly reached many types of trusts, there has been frequent litigation as
to their application to trusts whose income, as in certain trusts established
to absorb capital gains, was to be added to corpus.
Provisions in trust indentures that income-producing corpus may revest
in the grantor sometime in the future, but may not revest in the taxable
year in which the income or capital gain is realized, have enabled grantors
successfully to circumvent the restrictions of Section 166.5 The government,
thus faced with the inadequacy of Section 166, has occasionally invoked
Section 167, arguing that if taxable gains were to be added to corpus, and
if the corpus of the trust was to revest in the grantor, the grantor should be
taxed on those gains as income held for future distribution to him.0 But
the primary purpose of Congress in passing Section 219(h) of the Revenue
Act of 1924, the precursor of Section 167, was probably to tax the grantor
on income of a trust over which he reserved control, even though the in-
*Harry T. Rollins, 34 B.T. A., April 4, 1936. Four members dissented without
opinion.
1. 39 STAT. 757 (1916), 26 U. S. C. § 161 (1934).
2. See MoTGomY Am M A GL, FEDERAL TAXES oir EsmrA.s, TausTs AND
Gms (1935); Leaphart, The Use of thd Trust to Escape the Imposilion of Federat
Income and Fstate Taxes (1930), 15 CoroN. L. Q. 5S7; Sutter and Owen, Federal
Taxation of Setilors of Trusts (1935), 33 Mica. L. REv. 1169; Warren, The Reductiol
of Income Taxes Through, the Use of Trusts (1936), 34 Mrcn. L. R-v. S69.
3. Reference throughout the text unless otherwise indicated is to Sections 166
and 167 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAr. 840 (1928) which correspond to Section
219(g), (h) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 277 (1924).
4. Since 1932 the grantor is taxed on income distributable to him regardless of
discretionary control over it. 47 STAT. 221 (1932), 26 U.S.C. § 167 (1934); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 167-1, and since 1934 he is taxed on capital gains to a corpus
which will revest even though the corpus may not revest in the taxable year in which
the gain is realized. 48 STAT. 729, 26 U.S. C. § 166 (1934).
5. Langley v. Comnm'r, 61 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Lewis v. White,
56 F. (2d) 390 (D. Mass., 1932); Faber v. U. S., 1 F. Supp. 859 (Ct. CL 1932);
Mabel A. Ashforth, 26 B.T.A. 1188 (1932), (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 345;
Frances Marshall Canfield, 31 B.T.A. 724 (1934), (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 461;
cf. Clapp v. Heiner 34 F. (2d) 506 (IV. D. Pa. 1929).
6. Capital gain is treated as income of a trust under the Revenue Acts, Greenough
v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
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come were in fact distributed to the beneficiary. To insure this result, the
Section made the grantor's "discretion" as to the disposition of income a
factor determinative of tax liability. Accordingly, if the trust indenture
itself provided that income be held or accumulated for the grantor, the fact
that it would subsequently vest in him would apparently not make it taxable
to him under the Section, since such vesting would be independent of any
discretionary act on his part. Thus the problem of the government has been
to tax this and kindred types of trusts under the Section, despite the apparent
absence of a reservation to the grantor of power to dispose of the income.
For example, in Margaret S. Sawtell,8 the terms of the trust provided that
capital gains were to be added to the corpus, and were to become uncon-
ditionally distributable to the grantor on the first of January following
realization of the gain. The Board of Tax Appeals taxed the capital gains
to the grantor, arguing that Congress intended the undistributed income of
such a trust to be so taxable, and that the mere creation of such a trust
was an exercise of discretion by the grantor within the meaning of the
Section.9 The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,10 pointing out that while
the failure of Congress specifically to tax the gains of such a trust was no
doubt an oversight, nonetheless such a trust was not within the literal
meaning of Section 167.11 However, prior to this reversal, the Board had
itself expressly repudiated its earlier position as to the presence of "dis-
cretion" under such circumstances. It held in Preston R. Bassett=l that the
grantor was not taxable as to capital gains added to the corpus of a trust
which would vest in the grantor on the contingency that the beneficiary
predecease him, the statute being interpreted to mean that trust income
was taxable to the grantor only if he had positive discretion as to the dis-
tribution of trust proceeds.1 3 Subsequently the Board extended the doctrine
7. Senate Finance Committee Riport on the Internal Revenue Bill of 1924, p. 25,
§219(3);'cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Kaplan v. Conm'r, 66 F.
(2d) 401 (C. C.A. 1st, 1933); Grace Whitney Hoff, 20 B.T.A. 86 (1930).
8. 32 B.T.A. 687 (1935).
9. An alternative ground of decision was that Congress had not intended the
trust provisions of the statutes to be availed of merely for the purpose of tax avoidance.
10. 82 F. (2d) 221 (C.C.A. 1st, 1936). In refusing to follow the Board's
alternative ground "for decision, supra, note 9, the Court re-enunciated the doctrine
that motive to reduce taxes is not a criterion of liability. Comm'r v. Eldridge, 79 F.
(2d) 629 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) ; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916) ; ef. Reiling,
The Function of a Taxpayer's Ethics in Income Tax Liability (1934), 12 TAx IfAo.
294.
11. Taxing statutes are construed strictly in favor of the grantor. United States
v. Merriam 263 U. S. 179 (1923).
12. 33 B.T.A. 182 (1935).
13. It is possible to make a strained construction of the word "discretion" which
would bring either of these trusts within the Section. As the Board suggested in the
Saw ell case, merely by the act of creating a trust whose capital gains were to be
added to corpus, which in turn was to vest in the grantor at a future date, the grantor'
exercised discretion over the future distribution of the income. Moreover, as to a
trust whose corpus, by the terms of the trust, is at some time to revest in the future,
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of positive discretion beyond the facts of the Bassett case, holding in Edwin
L. Bowen'4 that capital gains of a trust, irrevocable unless the giantor gave
notice of his intent to revoke in the taxable year preceding revocation, were
not taxable to the grantor. In a recent case,"; however, involving a trust
with provisions substantially identical with those in the Bowen case, " the
Board, in effect overruling that case, recognized the discretion latent in the
power to give notice as sufficient to satisfy the statutory criterion and held
the grantor taxable on the capital gain to the trust. If, as the Board assumes,
the grantor could have given effective notice of his intent to revoke in the
taxable year in which the gain was realized, the decision seems a consistent
application of the Section; but if, as seems possible from the trust indenture,
such notice could not have been given until the year following realization of
the profit,'7 the grantor would have no discretion as to the disposition of
income in the year in which it was realized, an element which is prerequisite
to liability under a strict construction of the Section.
The constitutional inhibition against taxing A on the income of B18 does
not prohibit taxing the grantor on income of a trust over which he retains
discretionary control, since in such a case A has it within his power to
determine whether or not B shall receive the income.'0 But when the trust
indenture, as in the Sawtell and Bassett cases, provides that the capital gain
portion of the trust income shall be held for distribution to the grafitor after
the passage of time or upon the death of a beneficiary, a constitutional argu-
ment may be raised to the effect that the trustee, a taxable entity distinct
it is-within the discretion of the grantor whether he will accept the corpus or at some
time during the life of the trust make an outright gift of it to vest in the beneficiaries
at maturity of the trust. If capital gain income -were to be realized by such a trust,
it would seem to lie as much in the discretion of the grantor 'whether it would ba
distributed to him as it would in a trust over which he retaned complete powers of
revocation. See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930). But if the corpus is
not to revest, except on the happening of a contingency such as the death of a bene-
ficiary, as in the Bassett case, the power which the grantor has over the corpus is
subject to the non-occurrence of the contingency which, being a factor beyond his
control, might be considered to defeat his discretion. However, the Board has held
the grantor taxable on trust income which he could accumulate for distribution to
himself following the decease of a beneficiary. Kaplan v. Comm'r, 65 F. (2d) 401
(C.C.A. 1st, 1933).
14. 33 B.T.A. 203 (1935).
15. Harry T. Rollins, 34. B. T. A., April 4, 1936.
16. In the trusts both in this and the Bowen case, capital gains were to be added
to corpus, not distributed to the beneficiaries. In both cases the stock forming the
corpora of the trusts was transferred to the trustee in anticipation of the sale thereof
to an already ascertained buyer.
17. Both trust indentures contained a clause prohibiting revocation prior to the
first of January succeeding the creation of the trust which, under the circumstances,
might be construed to prevent operative notice from being served until the second year
of the trust's life and after the gain had been realized.
18. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 U. S. 206 (1931), Schlessinger v. Wisconsin, 270
U. S. 230 (1926).
19.. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930).
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from the grantor, is the recipient of the income and that since the grantor's
right to that income is dependent upon a contingency beyond his control, to
tax him on the income would be violative of due process. Such an argument
has been used to attack the validity of Section 167 of the '1932 and sub-
sequent Revenue Acts which eliminate discretion as a factor of taxability and
order trust income taxed to the grantor if it is to be, or inay be distributed
to him;20 but the objection, at least as applied to trusts like those in the
Bassett and Sawtell cases under the new act, seems untenable on two
grounds. First, the trust income which the grantor will eventually receive
is not distributable to the beneficiaries, unless the grantor die prior to ter-
mination of the trusts. The fact that the grantor has elected that the bene-
ficiary should have the use of the capital gain portion of the trust income
as capital between its realization and its eventual distribution to him should
not prevent taxation of such income to him.21 Secondly, the Supreme
Court has held the grantor taxable on distributed intervening income of a
three year irrevocable trust,22 on the ground that the grantor had failed
effectively to divest himself of ownership of the corpus. It is not yet clear
how far the grantor must go in divesting himself of sucl{ attributes in order
not to be taxable, but clearly the grantor in the Sawtell case was not so
divested of ownership as to make the imposition of a tax unreasonable,
assuming that the frust had been within the scope of the then existing
Section 167. The reservation of even a remotely contingent interest in the
grantor, implying control either of income or of corpus, should make it con-
stitutionally possible to require taxation of trust income to the grantor under
the new Section 167 in trust set-ups similar to those in the Sawtell and
Bassett cases 2 3
20. Under U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 167-1, income to a trust which may upon
any contingency be vested il the grantor is taxable to him. The constitutionality of
the section thus applied has been questioned. See MoNTGrOM Y AND MAGILL, FEDERAL
TAxEs oN ESTATES, Tauszs, AND GiFts (1935) 67, 75; Sutter and Owen, Fcderal
Taxation of Settlors of Trusts (1935) 33 Micir. L. REv. 1169; Warren, The Redic-
tion of Income" Taxes Through the Use of Trusts (1936), 34 Micrr. L. REv. 809.
Contra: Altman, Recent Developments in Income Tax Avoidance (1934), 29 ILL. L.
Rav. 154.
21. Even though temporarily held by the trustee, such income would in fact be
that of the grantor. Cf. Kaplan v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 401 (C. C.A. 1st, 1933).
22. DuPont v. Comm'r, 289 U. S. 685 (1933). The trust was to be used for the
payment of premiums for insurance on the grantor's life and the alternative ground
.of decision was that the trust was taxable under Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933).
The four Justices who dissented in the Wells case, concurred here only on the ground
of the grantor's failure to divest himself of the attributes of ownership.
23. Cf. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935), holding
§ 302(d) of the Revenue Act of. 1926, which taxes to a decedent's estate the corpus
of a trust revocable by the decedent and any other person, constitutionally applicable
to a trust revocable by the decedent and the beneficiary. Accord, Porter v. Comm'r,
288 U.S. 436 (1933); but cf. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39
(1935) ; White v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98 (1935). Caveat for the case where the capital
gain is distributed as income to the beneficiary, and the grantor retains only a con-
tingent remainder in the corpus.
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Even if such a broad view of Section 167 is followed, the capital gains
tax may still be avoided by other trust devices, such as the one also utilized
by the grantor in the7 principal case. He conveyed stock, subject to an
executory -contract of sale, to a trust over which his wife was given a
general power of appointment. Immediately prior to the closing of the sale,
the wife exercised her reserved power by creating a new irrevocable trust
of the stock, naming herself beneficiary, reversion to her survivors, and grant-
ing her husband power to direct the sale and investment of the trust corpus.
On the day this trust .was created, the husband directed sale of the stock
to the already ascertained vendee. Thus the profit on the transaction was
realized while the stock was in the hands of the trustee and the Board of
Tax Appeals upheld payment of the tax on that gain by him, rather than
by the original owner. Even though the intervention of a naked power of
appointment did not prevent the original owner, donor of the power, from
being considered the grantor of the ultimate trust and even though he
retained practical control of the stock until it was sold, since he could
not obtain the capital gain unless his wife predeceased him and since he
derived no legal benefit from the creation of the trust, - he could not be
taxed under the Revenue Act of 1928, applicable in this case. But gain,
under such circumstances, would be taxable to the original owner under
the present Section 166, on the ground that it was possible for the corpus to
be revested in him, the technical grantor, at some future time. If, however,
instead of using the power of appointment device, the owner had made an
outright gift of the stock to his wife, having her set up a series of trusts
which wquld vest in him after a term, it might provide a real saving in
capital gains taxes uxider the present act.25 In this, as in the many other
cases where income tax avoidance is'made possible by using the trust pro-
ceeds for the benefit of the grantor's family, - 1 thus indirectly redounding
24. The instant case could not be classified with those holding taxation not to
follow the incidence of legal title when anticipatory arrangements to avoid tx-mtion
have been undertaken, because in all such cases the liability of the owner of the capital
asset was predicated on the divesting of title being merely nominal: Phelps v. Comm'r,
54 F. (2d) .289 (C. C.A. 7th, 1931); S. A. MacQueen Co. v. Comn'r, 67 F. (2d) 857
(C. C.A. 3d, 1934); John S. Gulborg, 5 B.T.A. 628 (1926); Benjamin F. Woll-
mann, 31 B.T.A. 37 (1934); nor with those taxing the grantor who discharges a
legal duty with the trust proceeds for a husband owes no legal duty to his wife beyond
care and support. [Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551 (1935) (Trust for care,
education and support of children of grantor); Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935)
(Trust for payment of alimony); Helvering -. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552 (1935)
(Trust to repay bank loan); cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716
(1929); United States v. Boston and Maine R. R., 279 U. S. 732 (19M)].
25. As to whether so patent a device for evasion would be sanctioned, compare
U. S. v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 74 F. (2d) 360 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934)
and Valentine Bliss, 26 B.T.A. 731 (1932) with Benjamin F. Wollmann, 31 B.T.A.
37 (1934) and Jackson v. Comm'r, 64 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
26. "The solidarity of the family is to make it possible for the ta-xpayer to sur-
render title to another and to keep dominion for himself, or if not technical dominion,
at least the substance of enjoyment." Cardozo, J., in Burnet v. Wells, 239 U. S.
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to his own benefit, tax immunity is not inevitable. A solution lies in legis-
lative recognition of the entire family income as a unit for tax purposes.
The practical and constitutional2 7 objections to such a course are not in-
surmountable.
FRAiID ON A LIMITED POWER OF APPOINTMENT *
E, HOLDER of an equitable life estate with a power of appointment "to and
among her children or any other kindred who shall survive her, and in such
shares and manner as she shall think proper," appointed $250,000 by her will
to her cousin C. On the day the will was executed, C signed and delivered
to E a letter promising that "in consideration of the said bequest" he would
pay to E's husband, il', $100,000 "out of the said bequest." In a proceed-
ing instituted by one of E's executors fqr a construction of her will, the
surrogate interpreted the transaction as an attempt by E to give $150,000
to C and $100,000 to M, who she realized was not an object of the power,
and held the appointment, of V250,000 to C wholly void as a fraud on the
power.' The Appellate Division, with two justices dissenting, agreed with
the surrogate's interpretation of the facts, but modified his ruling by holding
the appointment to C valid to the extent of $150,000 and void only as to the
excess.3
670, 677 (1933). Thus, when the Revenue Acts provided non-taxability for the
grantor of a trust revocable by himself and a beneficiary, 45 STAT. 840 (1924), the
grantor retained complete control by making a member of the family a nominal
beneficiary. Smith v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 56 (C. C.A. 1st, 1932); Margaret A.
Holmes, 27 B. T. A. 660 (1933); cf. Comm'r v. Yeiser, 75 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935) (income of a trust revocable by settlor's husband who was not a beneficiary, not
taxable to settlor). Under the present act where a trust revocable by the grantor and
one not having a substantial adverse interest in the trust is taxable to the grantor,
the same result should be possible by giving sucl adverse interest to a family member.
Inter vivos gifts of income producing property to members of the family have
also been effective for tax reduction. If ownership and control of the property are
divested, the assignment is effective to transfer tax liability to the donee. Bing v.
Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927). -
27. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 U. S. 206 .(1931) and Schlessinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U.S. 230 (1926) are the most difficult constitutional obstacles in the way of such
a statute. It has been suggested that they can be met by basing the tax on the
combined family income and sharing it among the members of the family in the
proportion which the -income of each member bears to the income of the whole.
Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YALE L. 3. 1172; Surrey, Assign-
inent of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 791.
* In re Carroll's Estate, 247 App. Div. 11, 286 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1st Dep't 1936).
1. In re Carroll's Estate, 153 Misc. 649, 275 N. Y. Supp. 911 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
2. In re Carroll's Estate, 247 App. Div. 11, 286 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1st Dep't 1936).
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It has been uniformly said, at least since Tophaii& v. Duke of Porland,3
that a limited power of appointment must be exercised strictly in compliance
with the terms of the creative instrument, and that the appointee can take
only if he is one of the persons or group specified by the donor of the power.4
Direct or indirect deviation from the donor's express or implied directions
is generally considered a fraud on the power. Thus, if the evidence points
to an agreement between the appointor and the appointee that the latter shall
resettle the property on non-objects, or if the appointment is made solely
to fulfill some purpose foreign to that for which the power has been con-
ferred,7 the appointment is unenforceable. It is immaterial in such a case
whether the donee's fraudulent purpose appears on the face of the instru-
ment by which the appointment is exercised or, as in the New York case,
is one of the circumstances surrounding its exercise, known as a "bargain
behind;"8 and it is equally irrelevant whether the appointee knows of the
fraud or is entirely innocent.9 Nor, according to a distinction which is fre-
quently made between the motive and the purpose of an appointment,10 will
the fraudulent character of its exercise for a purpose outside the scope of
the power be mitigated by the fact that the motive is as socially laudable
3. I De G. J. & S. 517 (Ch. 1863), af'd, 11 H. L. Cas. 32 (1864).
4. Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. XV. (2d) 1051 (1928); Chenault's
Guardian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 482, 53 S. W. (2d) 720 (1932) ; It re
Mfarsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594 (Ch. 1859); FAnwELL, PowEns (3d ed. 1916) 147, 346
et seq.; 2 SUGDEY, POwAERS (Am. ed. 1837) *94-:-98; cf. In re Tinkers Will, 124 Misc.
723, 209 N. Y. Supp. 589 (Surr. Ct 1925), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 51, 154 N. E. 819 (1926);
Roach v. Trood, 3 Ch. D. 429 (1876).
5. Wellesley v. Mornmngton, 2 K. & J. 143 (Ch. 1855); In re Marsden's Trust,
4 Drew. 594 (Ch. 1859); FAxmvzI, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 10; 2 SuGnr, op. cit. supra
note 4, at *200-215. But cf. Beere v. Hoffmister, 23 Beav. 101 (Rolls Ct. 1856). The
nature of the conduct which will amount to fraud suflicient to vitiate an appointment
under a limited power should be distinguished from the common law concept of fraud.
See it re Carroll's Estate, 247 App. Div. 11, 18, 286 N. Y. Supp. 307, 314 (1st Dep't
1936). The execution of a power of appointment is sometimes held invalid as excessive,
but any distinction between a fraudulent and an excessive appointment would seem
dialectical. FARwELT., op. cit. supra, at 324, 430.
6. Sikes v. Sikes, 163 Ga. 510, 136 S. E. 523 (1927); Chenoweth V. Bullitt, 224
Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928) ; Daubeny v. Cockburn, 1 Mfer. 626 (Ch. 1816) ; Bir-
ley v. Birley, 25 Beav. 299 (Rolls Ct. 1858) ; Pryor v. Pryor, 2 De G. J. & S. 205 (Ch.
1864) ; Viant v. Cooper, 76 L. T. Rep. 768 (Ch. I897) ; 2 SuGDEN, op. cit. pra note 4,
at *200-*216. Contra: Tucker v. Sanger, 13 Price 607 (E.z. 1824).
7. VelIesley v. Mornington, 2 K. & J. 143 (C. 1855); In re Marsdea's Trust,
4 Drew. 594 (C. 1859); cf. Vatcher v. Paull, [1915] A. C. 372 (P. C.), (1930) 169
L. T. 5.
8. Birley v. Birley, 25 Bear. 299 (Rolls Ct 1353).
9. In re Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594 (Ch. 1859); Scroggs v. Scroggs, Amb.
272 (Ch. 1755) ; FAwELL, op. cit. mipra note 4, at 477.
10. Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. 3. & S. 517, 570 (Ch. 1863), aff'd, 11 H.
L. Cas. 32 (1864); Cochrane v. Cochrane, [1922] 2 Ch. 230, (1922) 154 L T. 430
semble; see FARWFjLL, op. cit. stpra note 4, at 484. But see (1935) 79 Sot. 3. 471.
19351
346 THE YA4LE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
as providing for dependents, 1 preventing an undesirable marriage12 or paying
the just debts of the appointee.13 On the other hand a properly appointed
object of a limited power may redispose of the property in any manner he
desires at any time after an effective appointment in his favor and irrespect-
ive of any wish or desire of either the donor or the donee of the power;14
and the appointment will not be set aside even though the donee knew that
*the appointee would immediately redispose in favor of non-objects of the
power.15 As a practical matter, there is in many cases only the invisible line
of legal fiction between an appointment void for collateral agreement to
favor a non-object and a valid appointment followed by a planned transfer
to a non-object; the distinction is one which places a premium on efficient
coaching of witnesses. Possibly as a result a minority of courts have held
appointments not too flagrantly violating the terms of the power effective
on the ground that the donor could have effectuated the same result by ap-
pointing the whole amount outright with a tacit agreement as to the final
disposition of the fund.10
Even under the strict rule, if both objects and non-objects are included in
an appointment and definite shares are allocated to the objects, the latter
can take, as the New York court held, and only those shares appointed to
non-objects go in default of appointment;17 but if the allocation between
objects and non-objects is not distinct, the whole appointment fails.18 'Simi-
11. Whelan v. Palmer, 39 Ch. D. 648 (1888).
12. Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. J. & S. 517 (Ch. 1863), aff'd, 11 H. L.
Cas. 32 (1864).
13. Ranking v. Barnes, 33 L. J. Eq. (N. s.) 539 (Ch. 1864).
14. FAnwmL., op. cit. supra note 4, at 473-476; see Birley v. Birley, 25 Beav. 299,
308 (Rolls Ct. 1858).
15. FARwvxt, loc. cit. supra note 14; see Pryor v. Pryor, 2 De G. J. . S. 205, 210
(Gh. 1864).
16. Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. 357 (Ch. 1794); White v. St. Barbe, 1 V. & B. 399
(Ch. 1813) ; Tucker v. Sanger, 13 Price 607 (Ex. 1824). Under either view the courts
apparently ignore a concealed agreement in cases where the appointment is made to an
intended wife, an object of the power, who simultaneously resettles the fund on her
intended husband, herself and their issue. Pryor v. Pryor, 2 De G. J. & S. 205 (Ch.
1864); see (1922) 66 SOL. J. 466.
17. Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. 3. & S. 517 (Ch. 1863), aff'd, 11 H. L.
Cas. 32 (1864); Lane v. Page, Amb. 233 (Ch. 1754); Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Ves.
Sr. 640 (Ch. 1755) ; Sadler v. Pratt, 5 Sim. 632 (Ch. 1833) ; Ranking v. Barnes, 33 L.
J. Eq. (N. s.) 539 (Ch. 1864) ; FARwELL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 488-497; 2 SUODEN, op.
cit rupra note 4, at *202, *203; see Whelan v. Palmer, 39 Ch. D. 648, 659 (1888) ("Not-
withstanding a contrary view in some cases, it has now been I think definitely settled,
and particularly by that judgment of Lord Justice Turner in Tophain v. Duke of Port-
land [mupra], that where you can see your way to sever the honest part from the
dishonest part, using the words in the legal sense, that is to say, that which is legally
right from that which is legally wrong, then you may give effect to that which is
legally right, notwithitanding that you hre obliged to avoid that which is legally
wrong.") ; cf. Davis v. Uphill, 1 Swans. 129 (Ch. 1818). But cf. Chenoweth v. Bullitt,
224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. (2d) 1061 (1928).
18. Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. (2d) 1061 (1928); Daubeny v.
Cockburn, I Mer. 626 (Ch. 1816); Whelan v. Palmer, 39 Ch. D. 648 (1888); It re
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larly, where the donee of the power has no intention whatever of benefiting
the object and uses him merely as an instrument in the conveyance of a bene-
fit to a stranger, the appointment is void in toto, even though the object takes
the greater benefit;19 and the rule is the same where the donee formally
appoints the fund to an object, but withholds beneficial enjoymentL-0 WVhere
the appointment fails, either wholly or partially, the invalidly appointed share
usually passes under the donor's provision for limitation over in default of
appointment," or, if there is no such provision, under the donor's residuary
clause.--
The refusal of the New York court to sanction the donee's attempt to
convey a benefit to a non-object of the power by the method used in the prin-
cipal case does not completely forestall the possibility of success under some
other technique of evasion. Although the donor's reliance on the donee's
discretion, implicit in the concept of a power of appointment, would seem
to justify a conditional appointment when, in the donees judgment, it is
netessary or desirable,2 the cases generally hold that an appointment may be
exercised on a condition only where express authorization appears in .the
terms of the power,-4 and that even then the performance must not result
in a benefit to non-objects.25 An appointment to C in this case on condition
that he pay $100,000 to ill would, therefore, have been no more successful
than the method actually adopted by E. But whether the same rule would
apply where the appointment is conditioned upon the appointee's paying a
non-object a certain sum or an annuity out of his own funds "has not been
settled. Alternatively, the donee might have effected a transfer to her husband
of the money, though not an enforceable claim to the money, by incorporat-
Perkins, [1893] 1 Ch. 283; FAEwLL, op. cit. stpra note 4, at 4S7. There is, however,
said to be a distinct tendency to convey some benefit to the appointee wherever pos-
sible. See Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 DeG. 3. & S. 517, 566, 572 (Ch. 13),
aff'd, 11 H. L. Cas. 32 (1864) ; Viant v. Cooper, 76 L. T. Rep. 763, 770 (CI. 1397).
19. Whelan v. Palmer, 39 Ch. D. 648 (1833).
20. Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. 3. & S. 517 (Ch. 1863), aff'd, 11 H. I..
Cas. 32 (1864).
21. Sadler v. Pratt, 5 Sim. 632 (Ch. 1833) ; Topham v. Duke of Portland, 1 De G. J.
& S. 517 (Ch. 1863), aff'd, 11 H. L. Cas. 32 (1864); Ranking v. Barnes, 33 L J. Eq.
(N. s.) 539 (Ch. 1864); 2 SUGODE, op. cit. supra note 4, at ¢216-=238.
22. Wright v. Wright, 225 N. Y. 329, 122 N. F. 213 (1919) semble. The disposi-
tion of the invalidly appointed share in the instant case was held to be controlled by
the residual clause within the appointment. But the invalidly appointed share will
generally pass under the donee's residual clause only where the donees intent to effect
that result is clearly apparent. Wright v. Wright, mipra. Accord: In re Chawshay
43 Ch. D. 615 (1890).
23. Wainwright v. Miller, [1897] 2 Ch. 255 sctnble.
24. Vatcher v. Paull, [1915] A. C. 372 (P. C.); 2 SUGDEZZ, op. di. .supra note 4,
at *9D-93; cf. Churchill v. Churchill, L. R. 5 Eq. 44 (Ch. 1867). Contra: Wainwright
v. Miller, [1897] 2 Ch. 255; cf. Roach v. Trood, 3 Ch. D. 429 (1876).
25. Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1051 (1923); Sadler v.
Pratt, 5 Sire. 632 (C. 1833); It re Perkins, [1893] 1 Ch. 283; Vatcher v. Paull, [1915]
A.. C. 372 (P. C.) ; see (1915) 49 In. L. T. 171; cf. Watt v. Creyke, 3 Sm. & G. 362
(Ch. 1856).
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ing precatory instructions in the appointment.20 An appointment with preca-
tory language will .be held invalid only if the relationship between the
appointor and the appointee is found to be such that the instructions amount
to duress2 7 or if the evidence reveals some prior discussion or arrangement
between the parties which the court can construe as a "bargain behind."2 8
Even this legal hazard might have been avoided, if the donee had complete
confidence in C, by an absolute appointment to C qualified only by an in-
formal oral understanding as to a transfer by C to M. In addition, where the
power is not restricted to a testamentary exercise, the donee may retain some
measure of control over -the disposition of the funds by simply reserving a
power of revocation in his appointment.29
APPLICATION OF GOLD LEGISLATION TO LEASE REQUIRING
RENTAL PAYMENTS IN GRAINS OF GOLD*
IN 1890 plaintiff's predecessor leased certain real estate from the defendants
for a term of 99 years at a quarter-annual rental of 139,320 grains of pure
gold The lessors were given the privilege, however, of demanding $6,000
in currency in lieu of the gold. Defendant lessors exercised this option until
1933, when they demanded gold bullion or, in the alternative, the payment of
$10,185.75, which was the price the United States was then paying for that
quantity of newly mined gold. 2 After paying this larger amount under protest
for one year, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover the overpayments and to
enjoin the defendants from collecting more than $6,000 or evicting them.
Judge Otis held3 that the lease called for the delivery of a commodity 4 and
26. In. re Crawshay, 43 Ch. D. 615 (1890), (1890) 34 SoL. J. 598. There was an ap-
pointment to R, "but who will I am assured settle the same voluntarily in the same
manner in which I have attempted to settle the same as aforesaid so as thereby to carry
out my wishes." In the absence of any extrinsic evidence, the court interpreted "I am
assured" in the sense of "I feel certain" rather than "as he assures me" and held that R
was given the fund absolutely and could make the resettlement or not as he pleased.
27. It re Marsden's Trust, 4 Drew. 594 (Ch. 1859).
28. Pryor v. Pryor, 2 De G. J. & S. 205 (Ch..1864) semble.
29. Adams v. Adams, Cowp. 651 (K. B. 1777); FARWEL., op. cit: supra note 4,
at 303; 1 STJGDEN, Op. cit. supra note 4, at *459 et seq.
*Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 15 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
1. The contract provided for rental payments in currency during the first six years
of the leasehold, and of bullion after that period.
2. 48 STAT. 1-2; 12 U.S.C. §95 (1933).
3. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 15 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Mo.
1936).
4. In reaching this decision he rejected the claim of plaintiffs that this was" an
alternative contract, under which one alternative was rendered impossible, so that the
other, in this case payment of $6,000, became an absolute duty. Irvine v. Postal Tele-
graph-Cable Co., 37 Cal. App. 60, 173 Pac. 487 (1918); Board of Education v. Town-
shend, 63 Ohio St. 514, 59 N.E. 223 (1900); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS (1932) §469;
3 WmLLsToN, CoxTRAcrs (1920) § 1961. But here the contract gave the right of choice
solely to the payee.
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therefore was not affected by the Gold Clause Resolution of June 5, 1933
which applied only to "money obligations".5 The court further held that,
although recent legislation G made transfer of bullion impossible,' payment
of $10,185.75, the value of the bullion at the present Treasury buying price,
would satisfy the contract requirement of payment in gold, since the lessors
were interested in gold only as a "symbol of value" and not as a commodity.
judge Otis suggested as an alternative that the lease be cancelled and the
lessees evicted.8
The court adopts inconsistent views of the gold clause in the present lease
to reach its decision. For the purpose of holding the Joint Resolution in-
applicable, judge Otis held that the lease called- for the delivery of gold as
a commodity.9 But when he came to value that gold to the defendants, literal
5. The Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 (Public Resolution No. 10, 73d Cong.
1st Sess.) 48 STAT. 112-113, 31 U.S. C. § 463 (1933) declared "obligations which pur-
port to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or
currency of the United States, or in an amount of money of the United States measured
thereby" to be against the declared policy of Congress respecting currency. It -.as
provided that such obligations shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in
any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private
debts. As used in the Resoluti6n, the term "obligation" is defined as "an obligation . . .
payable in money of the United States:' (italics added).
6. On April 5, 1933 an executive order was promulgated under Sec. 3 of the
Emergency Banking Relief Act [48 STAT. 2, 12 U.S. C. § 248(n) (1933)] requiring all
possessors to deliver any gold held over the amount of $100 to the Federal Reserve
Banks. -This order permitted the holding and acquisition of gold only for use in art,
industry, rare coin collections, and for export, and provided for licensing of transactions
not involving hoarding. This was held valid in Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317
at 328 (1935). See Nussbaum, Conparathe and Intenational Aspects of American
Gold Clause Abrogation (1934) 44 YArx L 3. 53, and materials cited.
7. If Judge Otis is upheld in viewing the gold clause in the lease as a commodity
contract, the transaction might conceivably be brought within one of the licensed excep-
tions to the gold regulations, permitting acquisition of gold for legitimate and customary
use in industry, profession, or art. 48 STAT. 1-2, 12 U. S. C. § 95 (1933) ; see note 6 supra.
Despite this possibility, and the even more remote one of opening a gold mine, the
transfer of gold under the recent gold legislation has been held sufficiently difficult to
make it legally impossible. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co.,
9 F. Supp. 451 (D. C. Mass. 1935); In re American Writing Paper Co., 11 F. Supp.
518 (D. C. Mass. 1935), aff'd, Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper
Co., 83 F. (2d) 398 (C. C.A. 1st, 1936). Cf. American Chicle Co. v. Sommerville Paper
Box Co., 50 Ont. L. R. 517 (1921). See W=r.Lismoi, Coxr.crs (1920) §9 1933,
1963, 1955.
8. The alternative of eviction is extremely harsh, since valuable improvements have
been placed upon the premises and the value of the land has increased. Under these
circumstances the loss incurred by vacating the premises, would be far greater than that
represented by the payment of $10,185.75.
9. Two similar cases, Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co.,
9 F. Supp. 451 (D. C. Mass. 1935), and In re American Writing Paper Co. 11 F. Supp.
518 (D. C. Mass. 1935) involved payment of rental being "a quantity of gold equal in
amount to $1,500 of the gold coin of United States of the standard weight and fineness
of the year 1894, or the equivalent of this commodity in currency." This was held to
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performance being deemed impossible, he regarded the gold as money; and
this latter view is the only one that seems justified.
It appears clear that the lease should be considered satisfied by the pay-
ment of $6,000 in legal tender; for the gold clause in the lease is not a con-
tract for the delivery of a commodity,10 but a money obligation within the
scope of the Joint Resolution, in reality requiring payment "in an amount
in money of the United States measured" by a quantity of gold. And Judge
Otis admitted as much when he ordered the lessee to pay $10,185.75 as
equivalent to the 139,320 grains of gold; for in that connection he contended
that the lessors were not interested in gold as a commodity, but used it in
their contract as a measure of value. When gold is used as a measure of
value, it is money; and, as Judge Otis implied, the rare" gold bullion clause
of the present case is functionally identical with the more familiar gold coin
or gold value clauses, and it seems difficult to hold it any less concretely a
money obligation. The lessors' purpose was to hedge against devaluation of
the dollar; but it is precisely, this purpose which all gold clauses attempt to
serve and which the joint Resolution proscribes.
But even if it is assumed that the Joint Resolution does not apply to this
lease, to value the gold payable to the lessors at the price paid for newly
mined gold by the government seems inequitable to the lessees. Such .pay-
ment might give the lessors more money than actual delivery of the gold
would bring them. It is likely that if the lessees managed lawfully to deliver
gold to the lessors, the lessors, unable legally to retain it, would be compelled
to turn it over to the government for $6,000.22 That the government could
be a commodity contract and so not within the Joint Resolution, but money payment
was allowed only at the same rate as before devaluation because that was the existing
market price. On appeal Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co.,
83 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) the court affirmed the result, but on the ground
that such a contract was contrary to public policy under the Joint Resolution as an
obligation which purported to give the obligee a right to require payment in an amount
of money of the United States measured by gold.
10. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634,
280 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1st Dep't 1935) (holding the Joint Resolution applicable to an
obligation to make gold payments in Dutch guilders, although the courts of the United
States universally consider foreign money a commodity) (1935) 49 HARv. L. REV. 152.
But see McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co., "10 F. Supp. 953 (N. D. Cal. 1935); Anglo-
Continentale Treuhand, A. G. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 81 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936); Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige D'lectricit6 [1934) A. C. 161.
See also Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt. 492, 4 AtI. 709 (1886) (note held non-negotiable
since it required payment of one ounce of gold which the court declared was not money).
11. It has even been stated by an authority in this field that such bullion contracts
do not in fact exist. Nussbaum, op. cit. supra note 6 at 55, ndte 9.
12. It was at this rate that the government requisitioned all gold in April, 1933.
Only special kinds of gold [newly mined, imports, scrap] are entitled to the higher rate.
There is even an outside chance that the lessors holding 139,320 grains of gold would
be liable to imprisonment, forfeiture of the gold, and a fine equal to twice the value
of the gold. 48 STAT. 1-2, 12 U. S. C. § 95 (1933); 48 STAT. 340 (1934), 31 U. S. C.
§ 443 (Supp. 1935).
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constitutionally requisition such gold seems clear. In the Gold Clause Cases,
where the government requisitioned gold at that rate, it wvas held that its
power extended to gold bullion as well as gold coin;13 and the Supreme Court
further held, with respect to a valid gold obligation unaffected by the Joint
Resolution, that a plaintiff suing for payment at the old price of gold could
prove no damage in terms of purchasing power,' 4 so that it might be held
that payment of $10,185.75 would unconscionably and unjustly enrich the
defendants here.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAx PROBLEMS ARIsIN; FROM ATTEMPrs BY
SETTLOR TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER PART OF THE
CORPUS OF AN IRREVOcABLE TRUST.*
IN 1927, decedent set up an irrevocable trust having a $300,000 corpus,
reserving a life estate to herself. This form of trust was held not to be,
taxable under the 1926 Federal Estate Tax"'imposed on transfers intended
to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death.2 And although
the Revenue.Act was amended in.19313 specifically to include trusts of this
type,4 there is considerable doubt as to whether the Amendment could be
constitutionally applied to trusts set up before it was passed.0 Accordingly,
13. Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317 at 328 (1935).
14. Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935). It is to be noted, however, that
when the government requisitioned gold in April, 1933 the dollar had not yet been
devalued to a definite figure. The emphasis of the Supreme Court upon purchasing power
as the criterion of damage indicates that the government may requisition gold today,
after devaluation of the dollar from 25.8 to 15-5/21 grains, nine-tenths fine, upon ap-
proximately the same terms as in 1933.
*Sellar Bullard, 34 B. T. A. 243 (1936).
1. §302(c) REVENUE Acr or 1926, 44 STAT. 70.
2. May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 23S (1930), and per curiam decisions dependent thereon,
283 U. S. 782,783, 784 (1931).
3. As a result of the decision in May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930), '.5,t00DO0O0
was refunded to taxpayers. See 74 CONG. RFc. 7193 (1931). The magnitude of this
loophole prompted instahitaneous action. See (1931) 2 Fio. L CHano. 46.
4. 46 STAT. 1516 (1931), 26 U.S.C. §411 (c) (1934), subsequently amended
without material change by the RrzvEru Acr oF 1932, 47 STAT. 279 (1932), 26 U.S. C.
§411 (c) (1934).
5. See Neuhoff, Retroipective Tax Laws (1935) 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 1; Lowndes,
A Day in, the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax (1935) 22 VA. L. RLy. 261,
283; Comment (1936) 45 YAL. L. J. 684, 689. But see Morrison, Some Recent Decisions
on Law of Taxation (1934) 22 CAw. L. REv. 277, 297; Ballard, Retrospective Federal
Taxation (1935) 48 HnAv. L. REv. 592, 602.
Influenced by this doubt, the Treasury Department ruled that the Amendment should
be applied only prospectively. T. D. 4314, X-1 Cum. BuLL 450 (1931). However, under
the Treasury Regulations issued with the Ravauu AcT or 1934, all such transfers are
to be included in the gross estate of a settlor dying after the effective date of the 1932
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the 1927 transfer by decedent was probably tax exempt.0 But in 1932, decedent
became dissatisfied with certain investment changes contemplated by the
trustee and decided to terminate the trust. To accomplish this it was thought
best to obtain the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries to the entry of a
decree declaring the trust invalid as violating the rule against perpetuities.7
All the beneficiaries agreed, including certain minors, except Mrs. Smith,
who had a life estate in the income from approximately $100,000 of the
corpus after decedent's life estate. In order to obtain Mrs. Smith's consent
the interested parties entered into an oral family agreement. In return for
all the beneficiaries' promises to acquiesce in the decree, decedent promised
to execute and deliver, prior to the court action, two documents which were
to become effective immediately on entry of the decree dissolving the original
trust. "One was an instrument creating a new trust of the same type as the
old one, having a corpus of $100,000, and giving Mrs. Smith a life estate
identical with her then existing interest; the other was an instrument con-
taining instructions to the trustee to transfer approximately $100,000 of
securities from the dissolved trust to the new trust corpus. Further, decedent
promised to make the other beneficiaries certain outright gifts and bequests
'in her will. This agreement was fully carried out in 1932; a court decree
was procured declaring the old trust completely void and its corpus the
absolute property of the decedent; and the trustee immediately transferred
the $100,000 in securities to the new trust. Upon decedent's death in 1933,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the corpus of this new trust
in her gross estate pursuant to the 1931 amendment. Her executors appealed
from this order relying chiefly on two contentions. First, it was argued that
the new transfer in trust was made by the beneficiaries and not actually by
decedent, for decedent had not possessed a beneficial interest in or equitable
title to the corpus after 1927, since prior to the dissolution of the old trust
she had delivered the new trust instrument with instructions as to the transfer
of the new corpus in accordance with a specifically enforceable contract.8
Act, provided the transfer was made after 1916. U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 18. That
this is an illogical, administrative compromise, see Ballard, supra, at 608.
6. Decedent died in 1933. Consequently, although the 1927 trust would not have
been taxable under the 1931 ruling of the Treasury Department, an attempt might have
been made to tax it under the 1934 ruling. See note 5, supra. However, the 1934 ruling
was not discussed in the instant case, probably because the appeal was taken before
the 1934 ruling was promulgated. But even had the 1934 ruling been involved, the 1927
trust would probably have been considered tax exempt. Cf. Mildred Kienbusch, B. T. A.,
Oct. 28, 1936.
7. Because some of the beneficiaries were minors, decedent believed that her only
possible means of regaining control over the trust corpus was to secure termination, of the
trust by getting it declared invalid. As to the difficulties she would have encountered in
using other methods, see p. 355, and note 18, infra.
8. Believing that equity should promote the amicable settlement of family differences,
the Illinois courts have repeatedly held family agreements to be specifically enforceable.
Stedman v. Tate, 326 Ill. 442, 158 N. E. 97 (1927) ; Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156
N. E. 334 (1927).
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In the alternative, it was urged that the transfer to the new trust came within
the statutory provisions exempting transfers made as a bona fide sale for
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.0 The Board
of Tax Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the order.' °
In holding that the creation of the second trust constituted a transfer
from decedent rather than from the beneficiaries, the Board seems to have
reached the proper conclusion in a rmanner which involves unnecessary diffi-
culty. The Board apparently reasoned that although decedent did not own
the trust property until the dissolution of the original trust, the court decree
voiding that trust restored to her full ownership of the property for an instant
before the new trust took effect; and that the retransfer of the property to
the new trusfee was a transfer from her such as is contemplated by the 1931
Amendment. But it can be argued that since the transfer from the original
trustee to decedent was made in pursuance of an oral agreement whereby
decedent promised to retransfer part of the property for the benefit of some
of the original beneficiaries, decedent received merely the interest of a con-
structive trustee, the transfer of which is not taxable."1 However, the Board
could have avoided this difficulty by declaring that, the original trust, having
been declared void, as violating the rule against perpetuities, was for this
purpose void ab initio; that decedent therefore had not in fact relinquished
any interest by the supposed transfer in 1927, but was the sole owner of
the property in question until 1932 when she contracted to create and then
created the new and valid trust; and that since she had continually possessed
ownership of the property and bad not obtained it merely by her promise to
retransfer, her interest at the time of the court decree could not be labelled
that of a constructive trustee, and the subsequent transfer in pursuance of
the contract was a transfer from her within the meaning of the 1931 Amend-
ment.12
9. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. §411 (c) (1934).
10. Sellar Bullard, 34 B. T.A. 243 (1936). An appeal was taken August 11, 1936,
to the Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit.
11. In Reed v. Commissioner, 36 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), real property
was conveyed to decedent by his children in return for decedents parol agreement to
devise all his property to them; he did so devise it, but reasoning from cases involving
the enforceability of such contracts despite the Statute of Frauds, the court decided that
he had held the property in trust, and that it was therefore not taWable to his estate.
Of course that case might not be followed where the contract was in writing, or where,
as in the instant case, personal property was involved, since in such situations trust
theory is unnecessary, the Statute of Frauds presenting no difficulties. But a difference
in treatment under the tax laws based upon such distinctions would be incongruous.
12. Where the transferor is not deemed a trustee, a transfer in trust in pursuance of
a contract has always been assumed to be ta'able unless otherwise exempt. See, e.g.,
McCaughn v. Carver, 19 F. (2d) 126 (C.A.A. 3d, 1927). In such cases, however, it
is not clear whether the transfer taxed is the transfer of the interest called "equitable
title" said to occur when the contract is made, or the later transfer of so-called "legal
title." The question would become important if, for e.xample, the family agreement in
the instant case had been made before the 1931 Amendment and the transfer in trust
after that year. If the tax is imposed on the transfer of "legal title," the holding in the
19361
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But even if the 1932 transfer in trust did proceed from decedent, it was
tax exempt if made pursuant to a bona fide sale in which Mrs. Smith's consent
to the entry of the court decree constituted adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth.13 This exemption provision is usually said to
mean that a transfer is to be taxed only if it was made with a donative intent
rather than as the result of a bargain at arm's length. 4 Where both con-
siderations exchanged under the contract have a readily ascertainable market
value, the courts seldom refer expressly to the parties' intent, but simply
compare the value of the considerations exchanged and deny exemption if
a gross 'discrepancy appears, perhaps considering this sufficient evidence
of a donative intent.' 5 But as it grows more difficult to measure the pecuniary
value of the considerations exchanged, it becomes correspondingly impractical
to employ a purely arithmetical standard. The courts then look to more
subjective evidence of intent and apparently consider not merely the contract
provisions relating to consideration, but all the surrounding circumstances,
such as the other terms of the contract, the relations of the parties, and any
facts indicating whether the contract was a business transaction or part of
a general plan for the testamentary disposition of property.10
Reed case, supra note 11, would necessitate distinguishing between the kind of legal
title held by a trustee and that held by the promisor under a specifically enforceable
contract. That the term legal title has different meanings in these two connections, see
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
23 YAT.B L. J. 16, (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 710, 767.
13. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U.S. C. § 411 (c) (1934). It is perhaps significant that
the term "fair consideration" had been used from 1916 to 1926, but was then changed to
"adequate and full consideration." Cf. Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 Fed. 961, 963 (C. C. A.
3d, 1924).
14. Latty v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Tait, 295 Fed. 429 (D. Md. 1923); William Schoenheit, 14 B. T. A. 33
(1928); It re Hess' Est. 110 App. Div. 476, 96 N. Y. Supp. 990 (4th Dep't 1906) ; see
2 BOGERT, TRuSTS AmD TRUSTEES (1935) § 276. But see United States v. Mitchell, 74 F.
(2d) 571 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934).
15. Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 Fed. 961 (C. C.A. 3d, 1924); McCaughn v. Carver,
19 F. (2d) 126 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; Charles K. Lincoln v. United States, 65 Ct. Cis. 198
(1928) ; Eugene Seigel, 19 B. T. A. 683 (1930) ;. State Street Trust Co. v. Stevens, 209
Mass. 373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911); Abstract Title & Guaranty Co. v. State, 173 Cal. 691,
161 Pac. 264 (1916); compare Glaser v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 8th,
1934), with Turner v. Commissioner, C.C. A. 3d, (1936) 4 U. S. L. WE=K 106; see
Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 272, 277. But cf. Lockwvood v. McGowan, 13 F. Supp.
966 (W. D. N. Y. 1936).
The statute taxes only the difference between the fair market value of the property
transferred as of the time of decedent's death and the value of the consideration received
by decedent 44 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U.S. C. §411 (i) (1934). But where a gross dis-
crepancy appears, the entire transfer is usually taxed. See cases cited supra note 14.
16. Phillips v. Gnitchel, 27 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) (transfers in trust by
husband and wife for each other); Central Union Trust Co., 24 B. T. A. 296 (1931)
(transfer in pursuance of prenuptial agreement between father and prospective son-in-
law) ; Latty v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) (promise by daughter
to make no further claim against her father's estate) ; see 2 BOGERT, 10C. Cit. .spra note
14; cf. Crooks v. Loose, 36 F. (2d) 571 (C. C.A. 8th, 1929).
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Neither the rules, however, nor their past application appear altogether
decisive when applied in the instant case. If the Board had looked merely to
the value of the considerations exchanged, the transfer might well have been
considered tax exempt. For the chief consideration received by decedent,
namely, Mrs. Smith's promise to consent to the court decree, greatly increased
decedent's chances of regaining possession of the old trust corpus, and its value
to the decedent therefore probably exceeded the value of her return promise,
conditional on dissolution of the old trust, to transfer one-third of the old
corpus to the new trust. But since the separate considerations had no readily
ascertainable market value, it would seem orthodox to look beyond their
relative values to other evidence of the parties' intent. And although Zecedent
probably dealt with Mrs. Smith without donative intent, that bargain was
only one part of a more comprehensive family agreement providing for the
testamentary disposition of decedent's property. Consequently, the nature
of the whole transaction might justify the denial of tax exemption, particu-
larly since in family agreements of this type, tax evasion might easily be
attempted by trumping up a dispute, the settlement of which could be con-
vincingly represented as a business bargain.
Since the dissolution of this type of trust, presumably tax exempt, and
the substitution of a new one may therefore render the new corpus taxable,U'
the question arises as to whether the settlor could regain control over part
of the corpus by other methods without incurring tax liability.'8 This might
be done by a modification or partial termination of the original trust either
by an agreement among all interested parties without court action or by a
court decree.'9 Presumably the undisturbed portion of the corpus would
remain tax exempt, for as to it no new tranfer would have occurred after
1931.P0 However, such methods are of limited usefulness. A modification
or partial termination by mutual agreement is, sustained on the theory that
17. Although not urged by decedent in the principal case, tax liability might have
been avoided by attacking the constitutionality of the 1931 Amendment. See Surrey
and Aronson, Inter Vizos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 Cor,. L.
REv. 1332, 1341; Robinson, Constitutionality of Federal and State Statates Taxing
Transfers with Income Reservations (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 612; Mfarx, When the
Settlor of a Trust Reserves the Life Interest (1936) 14 T. x MAo. 143. However,
such an attack would seem doomed to failure, probably on the theory that Congress
may take any reasonable measures to prevent tax evasion. See Lowmdeq, Constli-
tionality of the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 20 VA. L. REv. 141, 160; Lormdes, loc.
cit. sapra note 5; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. .. 684, 688; (1936) 49 HAsv. L. REv.
491; 2 BoGERr, op. cit. supra note 14, §272.
18. Although a complete termination of an irrevocable trust might also be obtained
on other grounds, such as fraud or mistake in its creation, or illegal purpose, the sub-
stitution of a new trust would raise the same problems as in the instant case.
19. See 4 BoGaav, oP. cit. supra note 14, c. 47; Rzs-rAnir, Tausms (1935)
§§ 330-345.
20. If the alterations were substantial, the tax might be applied even to the undis-
turbed portions of the original tax exempt trust on the ground that a new trust had in
fact been substituted. The difficulty would of course be to show that a new transfer had
occurred to which the tax might be applied.
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if all the parties consent, no one can be heard to protest.21 It follows that
if any interested party 2 refuses to consent, or, as .in the case of a minor, is
not bound by his acquiescence,23 the agreement is ineffective. Nor can these
difficulties be overcome by requesting a court to decree the desired modifi-
cation or partial termination. For it is well settled that except for an
unusual and very convincing reason a court will not alter any provision of
a valid, active, irrevocable trust which has an uncompleted purpose still
possible of fulfillment;24 and when there are minor beneficiaries involved,
the courts are even more hesitant to disturb the existing trust instrument.2d
An altdrnative method would be to procure a court decree declaring the
undesirable part of the trust void as violating some rule of law, and leaving
the remaining portion intact. But this device is also of limited value if it
must be shown that the unwanted part of the trust is actually invalid and
also separable from the valid remainder 20 In this respect, the implications
of the instant decision are rather startling, for the decedent apparently in-
duced the state court to declare the original trust void without investigating
what appears to have been an unfounded claim of invalidity27 merely by show-
21. Rowley v. American Trust Co., 144 Va. 375, 132 S. E. 347 (1926) ; Fredericks
v. Near, 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932); see 4 BocET, op. cit. s:tpra note 14,
§ 1002; Notes (1926) 45 A. L. R. 743, 749; cf. United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
296 U. S. 481 (1936). But cf. Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238
N. W. 284 (1931).
22. It is usually said that a trustee is not such an interested party. See RaSTATE-
tmIEN, TRusrs (1935) §§ 337, 342, 345; 4 BOGaRT, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1003. But
if the trustee refuses to give up the property in accordance with the agreement, the
other parties must institute court action to compel him. In that action, the court might
impose the same prerequisites to any change in the trust instrument as it would if
there had been no prior agreement.
23. Scheuing v. May, 213 IlI. App. 143 (1919); cf. Wirth v. Wirth, 183 Mass. 527,
67 N. E. 657 (1903) ; see 4 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1001. But see EnsrA =aEr,
TRusTs (1935) §§338-.340.
24. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889) ; Anderson v. Williams, 262
Ill. 308, 104 N. E. 659 (1914) ; Cady v. Tuttle, 127 Me. 104, 141 Atl. 188 (1921) ; Alder-
man v. Alderman, 178 S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897 (1935); cf. Weakley v. Barrow et. al.,
137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1917) ; Cary v. Cary et. al., 309 I1. 330, 141 N. E. 156
-(1923); Minot v. Tilton, 64 N. EL 371, 10 Atl. 682 (1887); see 4 BOGERT, op. Cl.
spra note 14, § 1002; (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 1000; Note (1926)'45 A. L. R.
743. But see REsTATEmENT, TRuSTS (1935) §337.
25. Hurt v. Gilmer, 40 F. (2d) 794 (App. D. C. 1930); Wirth v. Wirth, 183 Mass.
527, 67 N.E. 657 (1903); Mechling v. Meyers, 284 Ill. 484, 120 N.E. 542 (1918);
Homey v. Downs, 209 Ky. 255, 272 S. W. 728 (1925). But cf. DuPont v. DuPont, 19
Del. Ch. 131, 159 AtI. 841 (1933).
26. In the usual case both invalidity and separability must.be convincingly proved.
Anderson v. Williams, 262 fI1. 308, 104 N. E. 659 (1914) ; Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass.
220,. 12 N. E. 276 (1920).
27. The trust as set forth in the principal case indicates no violation of the rule
against perpetuities, and the doctrine of separable limitations might have been applied
to leave* two-thirds of the original trust corpus undisturbed, since the invalidity occurred,
if at all, in the remainder over of the one third in which Mrs. Smith had a life interest.
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ing the consent of all the interested parties, some of whom were representatives
of minor beneficiaries. s Logically this method might also be used to obtain
a decree of partial invalidity29 But it is inconceivable that this device would
often succeed unless there were considerable color to the claims of invalidity
and separability, since otherwise the entire law as to termination of irre-
vocable trusts could be avoided at will.30 Since the situations are therefore
limited in which an irrevocable trust can be modified or partially terminated,
there appears to be little opportunity for the settlor of a trust similar to the
one in the principal case to regain possession of part of the corpus without
incurring tax liability under the 1931 Amendment.30
28. Where it is claimed that an irrevocable trust is invalid, the claim must be ea-
tertained, and if well-founded, the trust will be declared void regardless of the L6stence
of minor beneficiaries. Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243 (1373); Anderson v.
Williams, 262 IIl. 30S, 104 N. E. 659 (1914); cf. Coolidge v. Loring, 235 Mass. 220,
126 N. E. 276 (1920). But if the only basis for the decree of invalidity is the consent of
all interested parties, the acquiescence of a minor should be no more effective than where
it is attempted to procure aft alteration or partial termination by unanimous consent.
In the principal case, the state court may have felt that the minors! interests were
sufficiently protected by the family agreement to warrant invalidating the original trust
merely on the basis of their consent. Cf. Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 IlL 165, 156 N. F 4 334
(1927).
29. See 4 BOGaRT, op. cit. mipra note 14, § 1002; RFlSTATrMMET, TausTS (1935) § 333.
30. However, a dissatisfied settlor might well try this device, for there is nothing to
be lost thereby, while if the court can be induced by unanimous consent to dissolve the
trust on an unfounded allegation of invalidity, there would be no one desiring to appeal
it at. the time, and the decree might well become res adjudicata even as to the minor
beneficiaries. See Thompson v. Ma.:'well Land Grant Co., 163 U. S. 451, 463 (197).
If the minor beneficiaries reached majority and attacked the original decree, they might
not find it easy to have the dissolved trust then restored even though the originl decree
would have been reversed had it been seasonably appealed. See Swift & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 311, 324 (1928).
31. Obviously, if the 1931 Amendment can be applied retroactively to irrevocable
trusts created before its enactment, new trusts substituted for them will be ta-mble.
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